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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of soft power versus hard power in U.S. 
policy towards Latin America.  In recent years America’s unipolar moment has been challenged 
from populist leaders in the region to its inability to get a handle on the flow of illegal 
immigrants and illicit drugs that reach its shores.  This thesis is a step to understanding the 
difference between power and influence as well as the effects of hard power and soft power in 
U.S. foreign policy.   
A historical comparative case study analysis has been conducted utilizing the cases of 
FDR’s Good Neighbor policy and Reagan’s contra war policies.  This qualitative approach 
examined specific short-term and long-term goals of each policy and analyzed each strategy’s 
ability to achieve those stated goals.  The results of the study reveal that both soft and hard 
power approaches can have positive as well as negative effects on American influence in Latin 
America. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
The current state of international relations is often referred to as the unipolar moment due to the 
uncontested military capabilities and overall prowess of the United States.  However, with this 
power has come resentment and resistance, which ultimately questions how much bona fide 
influence the most powerful country in the world truly possesses.  This paper is an analysis of 
U.S. power and how it affects influence in the Latin American region.  I hypothesize that the 
traditional use of hard power as the predominant foreign policy method employed towards Latin 
America has damaged overall U.S. influence.  By examining the effects of two historic cases, 
one that exhibits soft power traits and another that depicts hard power tactics a better 
understanding of American influence in the region can be attained.   
What exactly is the difference between soft power and hard power?  These terms were 
developed by former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of the Kennedy School of 
Government at Harvard University Joseph Nye to illustrate the different characteristics of power 
when used to influence behavior.  When power is used to coerce or induce conduct it reflects the 
concept of hard power.  Hard power is typically associated with the realist perspective of 
international relations theory that mainly asserts power comes from military and economic 
means.  In other words, the ability to financially implement economic sanctions on a nation or 
unilaterally invade another country with one’s army in order to influence the behavior of it are 
hard power strategies.  Therefore, hard power is the ability to force the outcomes one wants.  
Soft power on the other hand refers to the power of attraction.  Rather than being threatened to a 
particular outcome actors willingly go along with the preferences of another state, thus “soft 
power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others” (Nye, 2004, p.5).  Political ideals, 
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popular culture, and cooperation like that found in multilateral organizations can often prompt 
actors to be attracted to the desires of another country.  For example, during the Cold War 
freedom of political expression along with American pop culture caused many Russians to want 
what the United States had.  At the same time, although soft power attracted the Russian people 
to the free market system, hard power through America’s nuclear arsenal threatened the Soviets 
from intruding too far into the American sphere of influence.  In sum, soft power can be linked to 
as Nye says, the “co-optive end of the spectrum of behavior, whereas hard-power resources are 
usually associated with command behavior” (Nye, 2004, p.7).   
The specific cases I am utilizing to reflect soft power and hard power tactics will be 
Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy and the contra war in Nicaragua taken place during 
Ronald Reagan’s Administration, respectively.  By examining these two dissimilar cases one 
should be able to uncover which type of power approach leads to more influence in the Latin 
American region.  Influence is vital because it equates to the achievement of American 
objectives.  
The level of American influence in geopolitics has most recently come into question 
during the current Iraq War.  In 2003, the United States led a military coalition in the swift and 
successful invasion of Iraq.  There was little argument that the United States’ massive military 
capacity was the chief reason for the victory, and it is without debate that the United States could 
have performed equally as triumphant on the battlefield if a ‘coalition of the willing’ had never 
been formed.  However, the current situation of rebuilding war-torn Iraq has proven to be a 
challenge the United States does not appear to have the power to do alone.  In regards to 
insurgents, radical Islamic fundamentalism, and sectarian violence U.S. influence is absent from 
the scene.  During the early stages, perception of American power was exceedingly high for 
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members of the president’s administration and other proponents of the war, thus a genuine 
attempt to reach out and garner more international support for the invasion did not take place.  
This has consequentially caused the United States to stand nearly alone in the rebuilding effort 
while members of the European community toss rebuffs at the country that pulled a deafened ear 
to their earlier concerns over the war. 
While a majority of the world is trying to come to grips with the notion that the United 
States is the world’s sole superpower with considerable unchecked military power, Latin 
America has had to face such a fact for most of its post-colonial history.  For instance, Thomas 
Jefferson believed it was possible for the United States to take control over Spain’s former 
empire “peice by peice [sic]” (Smith, 2000, p.18).  And the interventions that would occur from 
Teddy Roosevelt’s era through the Clinton Administration provided a constant scare that the 
colossal neighbor to the north had the ability to interject into Latin American affairs at its will.  
The fact that Latin America was the first to contend with America’s undiluted power permits the 
region to be an interesting study population for an analysis on American power approaches.  At 
the same time it provides reasoning behind why countless scholars claim there to be a troubled 
relationship between the United States and Latin America.    
A more comprehensive literature review will follow in the subsequent chapter, however a 
brief overview of what scholars and practitioners are saying about inter-American relations and 
U.S. foreign policy approaches is pertinent at this time in order to introduce and understand the 
backdrop of my thesis study.  While a great deal of authors criticize the United States for past 
policies that they argue have hampered its relationship with Latin America, others contend 
traditional U.S. policy is the only remedy to fix this troubled relationship and rebuild American 
influence in the region.  For this first camp, their argument often centers on the notion that U.S. 
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policymakers do not fully understand Latin American affairs.  As James Reston a foreign 
correspondent for The New York Times once stated, “the United States will do anything [aid, 
investment, political pressure, military intervention] for Latin America except read about it” 
(Wiarda, 2006, p.85).  This lack of willingness to learn and have a handle on the affairs of its 
southern neighbors has consequentially caused difficulties to arise.     
Julia Sweig of the Council on Foreign Relations notes that the United States often gathers 
intelligence about Latin American countries from its elite and powerful citizens rather than from 
those without power in the general population.  She has coined this phenomenon the 80/20 
Divide, where American policymakers concern themselves with the interests of the elite sector of 
a Latin American country while not paying any attention to the remaining eighty percent of the 
citizenry (Sweig, 2006, p.37).  The electoral victory of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela is a prime 
example of the 80/20 Divide at work.  For the past fifty years Sweig notes the United States has 
gained information about the country from the top twenty percent of Venezuela’s private sector, 
politics, and the oil industry; thus when Chávez came into prominence representing the needs of 
the unheard majority American policymakers were ignorant to his potential power.  Therefore, 
Sweig asks without an understanding of the desires of the Venezuelan people how was the 
United States expected to build any influence? 
In general it has been argued if it is not a matter of misunderstanding Latin American 
affairs it is forgetting the effects of past U.S. action that have hurt American influence in the 
region.  In fact, there is an axiom in the history between the United States and Latin America that 
the United States never remembers and Latin America never forgets.  Jorge I. Domínguez wrote 
in a 2003 article for Foreign Policy that “Nicaraguans have much to teach the cabal in Kabul 
about how the United States forgets its nice rhetoric and apparent commitment to its erstwhile 
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allies” (Domínguez, 2000, p.34).  This inability to follow through on promises has often left a 
feeling of rejection and neglect amongst the Latin American people.  Robert Pastor has likened 
U.S. policy toward the region to a whirlpool because the United States is often sucked into 
regional crises only to be released as events elsewhere capture American attention (Pastor, 2001, 
p.ix).  This traditional strategy of policy by crisis combined with an array of hard-line unilateral 
policies from sanctions to military interventions has caused several scholars and former 
policymakers to make the case for a change in the U.S. stance towards Latin America.   
For example, Moisés Naím, the editor in chief of Foreign Policy magazine asserts 
President George W. Bush should make two specific changes, end the embargo with Cuba and 
actively engage with Brazil.  Naím claims U.S. obsession with crises in small nations like Cuba, 
Grenada, and Haiti have prevented it from focusing on building an influential alliance with 
Brazil, the largest and arguably most powerful country in Latin America, who could serve as a 
viable partner in achieving broader U.S. goals (Naím, 2006, p.35). 
In addition, former U.S. ambassador Robert White has echoed this cry for less unilateral 
ventures.  White argues the United States should have convoked a meeting with foreign ministers 
of the Organization of American States (OAS) after the temporary overthrow of democratically 
elected Chávez in 2002 (White, 2005, p.11).  Although Chávez was an obstacle to U.S. goals, the 
decision to denounce him and praise the illegitimate un-elected regime went against America’s 
values of democracy, for which White contends hurt the U.S. image of representing democratic 
principles.  As a result, U.S. influence diminished as exhibited by the unsuccessful bid of its 
hand picked candidate for secretary general to the OAS.  Member states rejected the American 
nominee under Chávez’s lead, who was now seen as a hero in an event that had “all the elements 
of a David vs. Goliath morality play” (White, 2005, p.11).  White further states, “American 
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failures abroad usually occur when we violate the ideals that undergird our society” (White, 
2005, p.11).               
This has been the case made by Joseph Nye who claims “those who scorn or despise us 
for hyprocrisy are less likely to want to help us achieve our policy objectives” (Nye, 2004, p.55).  
In addition to following our own standards, Nye favors the use of cultural exchanges between 
Americans and citizens of foreign contries to help build lasting relationships, which he argues 
can ultimately increase U.S. influence.  For example, he reports the account of a former high 
official in the Russian KGB who commented that “exchanges were a Trojan Horse for the Soviet 
Union” and that “they played a tremndous role in the erosion of the Soviet System” (Nye, 2004, 
p.46).  Nye notes the reduction of funds for public diplomacy, travel bans like that with Cuba, 
and the overall focus on military hard power as areas where U.S. foreign policy has gone wrong.    
However, are Naím, White, and Nye correct to assume a change towards a softer U.S. 
policy will increase America’s influence?  In other words, could cultural exchanges with the 
Venezuelan public not only have prepared the United States for a Chávez electoral victory, but 
influenced the public to elect another candidate?  Moreover, is the traditional hard-line approach 
truly responsible for less American influence in Latin America today?  This thesis is an attempt 
to answer such questions.     
I noted earlier that Latin America offers a valuable study population to analyze U.S. 
power approaches because of the region’s long history of dealing with American ascendancy.  
Also mentioned above I described my intentions to analyze two notable cases in the history of 
U.S. Latin American relations, the Good Neighbor policy and the contra war in Nicaragua in 
order to determine what effect the power approaches used in each of these cases had on 
immediate and long-term U.S. influence in Latin America.  Through this comparative historical 
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case study it should be revealed whether or not soft power tactics like those used during the 
Good Neighbor policy or hard power techniques such as the ones implemented during the contra 
war against the Sandinistas produces more influence for the United States in Latin America.  
Therefore this study should also help explain why several scholars recognize a problem for the 
United States in its relationship towards the region.    
 My dependent variable is American influence.  This concept refers to the overall sway 
the United States possesses in Latin America.  In general a qualitative approach will be used to 
determine the variability of influence the United States holds.  For instance, judging how easily 
and successful the accomplishment of subsequent objectives or desires were in the region 
provides an indicator of how much influence was obtained from that particular power approach.  
The independent variables soft power and hard power are also codified in a qualitative manner.  
A detailed explanation on how the Good Neighbor policy and the contra war fit the soft and hard 
power traits will be addressed in chapter three, nevertheless one should be able to comprehend 
the difference between soft and hard power using the definitions cited above in the chapter’s 
opening paragraphs.  However, the independent variables are certainly not limited to just those 
indicators, and furthermore it is quite possible after an extensive investigation, although unlikely 
because they were chosen for their polarity, to claim that my two selected case studies the Good 
Neighbor policy and the contra war in Nicaragua are a combination of the two power approaches 
at varying degrees.   
The Good Neighbor policy refers to Franklin Roosevelt’s foreign policy strategy towards 
Latin America during his tenure as president.  It is a unique moment of time in inter-American 
relations because of the emphasis put on nonintervention and the importance of public 
diplomacy, which is a strong characteristic of a soft power approach.  The foreign policy 
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techniques used before and after the Good Neighbor era contrast greatly from the events that 
occurred during Roosevelt’s Administration, thus the Good Neighbor policy offers a valuable 
case for a comparison of power approaches.  The contra war in Nicaragua is an equally 
beneficial case for this study because it reflects hard power policies such as military intervention 
and economic threats.  Furthermore, the extensive use of coercive diplomacy and unilateral 
action by the Reagan Administration counters elements of the soft power concept.  Moreover, as 
a relatively recent event in hemispheric relations participants in the episode can provide 
contemporary discussion on the affair’s effect on U.S. influence today.   
The selection of those two cases I believe best reflects the soft power and hard power 
approaches and U.S. foreign policy to the region as a whole.  Of course, additional events could 
have also been selected with comparative significance to serve as the independent variables, 
however due to the constraints of this short study it has been decided to closely examine two 
events, one related to soft power and the other related to hard power, in greater detail rather than 
glance at a wide range of very old and perhaps inconsequential events. 
I predict my investigation will reveal support for my hypothesis that hard power when not 
supported by soft power has diminished American influence in Latin America.  I have this 
inclination because there are a number of examples outside of those in my case study that do 
point to this line of reasoning.  As noted above cultural contacts during the Cold War have been 
cited as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for the Soviet Union in their defeat.  In 1994 Reinhold Wagnleitner and 
Diana M. Wolf published Coca-Colonization and the Cold War to illustrate how America’s pop 
culture influx into Austria following the Second World War triggered Austrians to imitate 
American life; they also note “Hollywood products were an important weapon in the arsenal of 
the United States” during the ideological fight with the Soviets  (Wagnleitner and Wolf, 1994, 
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p.237).  This helps explain why Austria, although militarily neutral during the conflict, 
maintained a capitalist economy while being nearly completely surrounded by communist states 
or members of the Warsaw Pact.    
In addition to pop culture, soft power through the attraction of ideals has also proven to 
be influential.  For example, Joseph Nye has written about China’s success with their recent rise 
of soft power.  He notes their entry into the WTO, assistance with the six-party talks on North 
Korea’s nuclear proliferation, and the overall attraction of Chinese culture exhibited by the 
increasing broadcast coverage of China Radio International and the ever-growing number of 
tourists who visit the country each year as signs of increased Chinese soft power (Nye 2005).  
Nye believes this rise in soft power correlates with increased influence; despite the fact the 
country remains authoritarian.  He argues the “Beijing Consensus,” the combination of 
authoritarian government with market economics “has become more popular than the previously 
dominant Washington Consensus” (Nye 2005).  Although the Chinese model may not appear 
attractive to the United States or Western Europe, Nye contends it has made way in parts of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America where semi-authoritarian regimes are trying to develop.            
Just as an increased amount of soft power can help a country gain influence on the 
international stage, a decrease in soft power can have adverse affects. This is evident in the 
comparison of the coalitions President Bush Sr. and current President George W. Bush were able 
to construct in each of their American led invasions into Iraq.  By consulting foreign heads of 
state and genuinely respecting multilateral organizations the first President Bush was in the end 
able to gather a coalition that did not burden the U.S. military as much as the one constructed by 
his son.  In a 2003 interview with John Meacham the elder Bush candidly compared his and his 
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son’s efforts by correctively stating, “My coalition-building was far easier;” a keen observation 
that reflects how soft power has affected influence (Meacham, 2003, p.43). 
The Mexican-American War provides an additional example where hard power not 
supported by soft power can hurt influence.  The controversial conflict between the United States 
and Mexico regarding competing claims to modern-day Texas eventually resulting with Mexico 
loosing a third of its territory instigated not only over a century of anti-American sentiment, but 
major difficulties for subsequent U.S. presidents trying to achieve regional influence.  For 
instance, the war caused Mexico to look outward for assistance and security to prevent further 
U.S. encroachments, such as creating ties with France; thus countering the intentions of the 
Monroe Doctrine to keep European powers out of New World affairs (Smith, 2000, p.22).  
Therefore in conclusion, through the Cold War, Chinese, Gulf Wars, and Mexican-American 
War examples I am confident that soft power plays an intricate role in international influence, 
and thus when analyzing the Good Neighbor policy and the contra war in Nicaragua I expect to 
find similar results.   
In regards to this project’s contribution to academia and the political science discipline it 
will undoubtedly increase the overall knowledge of the relationship between the United States 
and Latin America.  As lawmakers and political scientists confront the rise of intermestic issues 
in the American political dialogue, a greater understanding of how to deal with Latin America on 
the matters of immigration, drug trafficking, and the outsourcing of jobs becomes increasingly 
crucial.  Specifically this paper will shed light on the impact different power approaches have 
had on American influence.  While a great deal of scholarly work has been conducted on the 
concept of power and analyzing hemispheric relations, little if any have tested the soft power and 
hard power approaches of U.S. foreign policy in a historical setting.  Moreover, the conclusions 
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of my thesis report should help policymakers determine the best types of power approaches to 
use in constructing American foreign policy.   
 
 12
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
It is impracticable to determine which foreign policy approach produces more influential gains 
for the United States without examining what scholars have stated about soft and hard power and 
investigating past hemispheric relations.  As peace advocate and former editor of the Saturday 
Review Norman Cousins once stated, “History is a vast early warning system,” and therefore 
current U.S. policymakers would be foolish not to use such a practical system for prescribing 
future Latin American policy (Cousins 1978).  An overwhelming majority of the literature on 
past hemispheric relations recognizes a long history of problems between the United States and 
Latin America that continues to exist today; from scholars such as Howard J. Wiarda who 
questions the degree of neglect the United States has shown to its southern neighbors, to former 
diplomats like Robert A. Pastor who regards U.S. policy to the region to be erratic and one that 
solely reflects crisis management.  Although not all authors call for a radical adjustment to the 
U.S. strategy towards Latin America, nearly all write about the rapport in a manner that 
resembles an unhealthy relationship that has affected American influence; very few attempt to 
counter this otherwise accepted fact.  For example, Henry Raymont titled his text on U.S. Latin 
American relations Troubled Neighbors to accentuate this reality.  At the same time a great deal 
of scholarly muscle is spent analyzing and debating who is at fault for these poor relations and 
almost always the United States is deemed responsible; not so much in the sense that the United 
States has been attempting a form of neo-colonialism, but rather for repeatedly and blatantly 
disrespecting its southern counterparts.  Hence, current literature is besieged with such critical 
titles as Talons of the Eagle and Beneath the United States.  These scholars blame the tradition of 
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policies characteristic of hard power approaches as the root of the problem between the United 
States and Latin America.  
On the opposite end of the spectrum there exists a small assortment of literature on U.S. 
Latin American relations that does not recognize a serious problem with the U.S. tradition of 
focusing on hard power tactics within its foreign policy approach towards the rest of the 
hemisphere.  For example, Mark Falcoff of the American Enterprise Institute and former 
professor Susan Kaufman Purcell have written extensively for the inclusion of hard power policy 
approaches to Latin America in response to America’s difficulties in acquiring more influence in 
the region.  Although small in number these writings deserve attention not so much for balance, 
but for the sake that U.S. policy towards Latin America has remained relatively consistent to 
their preferred policies of hemispheric imperialism, military intervention, and paternalism; thus 
these writers can be deemed successful in their attempts to persuade policymakers to implement 
more of the same, even though a tremendous amount of literature argues for a softer approach.  
This chapter will be presented in three sections: an analysis of the theoretical foundations on the 
concept of power, an examination of foreign policy adaptation in terms of continuity and change, 
and lastly a review of the current literature on U.S. relations with Latin America.  The intent is to 
conduct an examination of prior analyses on hemispheric affairs in order to provide a greater 
understanding of why certain approaches may have been utilized over others.   
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The Conceptual Framework of Power 
History  
Prior to a review of the current literature on hemispheric relations one must ask why the world’s 
most powerful country even has a problem with influence in Latin America?  Ultimately the 
answer rests on how one defines power.  In 1970 Robert Dahl defined power as “the ability to 
get another actor to do what it would not otherwise have done or not to do what it would 
otherwise have done” (Brown, 2001, p.91).   However, that definition is limited because it does 
not address the power of having an actor want what you want.  A more encompassing description 
of power has been labeled as “the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes 
one wants” (Nye, 2004, p.2).  In this respect power can be broken up into separate types, as 
Joseph Nye notes, “there are several ways [successful and unsuccessful] to affect the behavior of 
others”(Nye, 2004, p.2; see also Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Therefore, none of these separate 
types or abilities should automatically equate to influence.   
Nevertheless, historically power has been viewed as being of concrete attributes, such as 
size and quality of raw materials or of the armed forces of a particular country (Brown, 2001, 
p.89).  In fact, power in the traditional sense was synonymous with military might.  Hence the 
classic anecdote of Joseph Stalin mockingly inquiring about how many divisions the Pope had 
when the Church questioned his repressive policies toward Catholics.  The perception that one 
with more might had more influence may have begun with the earliest of interactions between 
human beings, but it still holds resonance with contemporary political theorists.  For example, 
the realist and neo-realist perspective often emphasizes the importance of hard power. 
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Realists and Liberals 
A discussion on the realist perspective of power ought to begin with Hans Morgenthau who 
placed the concept of power at the very center of international relations studies.  He argued that 
states compete for power with one another out of national interest.  Similar to Morgenthau John 
Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago offers a strand of 
realism (offensive realism) that claims that because of anarchy in the international system states 
will struggle for power and seek hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.xiii).  Taking this theory into 
consideration, it becomes easy to see why Mearsheimer recommends for the United States to 
reexamine its policy towards a rising China.  Mearsheimer believes China will not rise 
peacefully and the likelihood of intense security competition will create the potential for war 
(Brzezinksi and Mearsheimer, 2005, p.46).  And although at the present time he notes China 
does not have the capability to militarily challenge the United States he believes by 2025 they 
could.  Therefore, because of the anarchic context of international politics he suggests to U.S. 
policymakers “it is better to be Godzilla than Bambi” and thus military buildup is prudent for a 
response to a growing China.   
This logic coincides with the theory of the security dilemma.  Since it is in the interest of 
all countries to gain security the likelihood of improving one’s security through military buildup 
becomes a certainty.  However, as one state increases their military capabilities other countries 
feel less secure, thus causing a security dilemma and a fierce arms race to occur between 
insecure states.  As the father of neorealism Kenneth Waltz once proclaimed, “[rational] states, 
unsure of one another’s intentions, arm for the sake of security and in doing so set a viscous 
circle in motion” (Waltz, 1979, p.186).  Considering this fact, Mearsheimer believes it to be 
wrong for the United States to even engage with the Chinese on economic terms (Mearsheimer, 
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2001, p.4).  Although he concedes the argument has been made that successful engagement with 
China could lead to a wealthy and democratic state, he perceives economic might will certainly 
translate to military might, which reflects his emphasis on the importance of U.S. hard power.  
Lawrence F. Kaplan gives credit to the use of American hard power and specifically the 
military intervention in Iraq for the “democratic wave sweeping over the Middle East and 
Central Asia” (Kaplan, 2005, p.22).  Citing the examples of Georgia, Krgyzstan, and the 
Palestinian Authority, Kaplan contends, “absent direct U.S. intervention [in Iraq], not one of 
these movements would have succeeded” (Kaplan, 2005, p.22).  Charles Krauthammer agrees 
noting that it has also been America’s hard power tactics particularly with its interrogation 
techniques that have prevented another terrorist attack on the United States.  For instance, he 
specifically mentions the controversial interrogation method of water boarding as one of the 
reasons why President Bush has been able to keep Americans safe (Krauthammer, 2006, p.35).  
Furthermore, Krauthammer opposes arms control because it limits the means for which the 
United States can protect itself.  In 2000 he supported Bush’s proposal to end American 
compliance with the ABM treaty because he believed tailoring U.S. defensive strategies to the 
desires of other nations did not make sense.  He commented,  
If we want to build a defensive shield, why ask the Russians? . . . We build to order.  Our 
order . . . Read my lips.  No new treaties (Krauthammer, 2000, p.132).     
In contrast, the liberal internationalist view argues it does matter what other states think 
because in part fueled by globalization, the United States cannot be isolated from the rest of the 
world, and thus cooperation and international institutions become necessary components for 
success in world politics.  Nearly thirty years ago Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye wrote that, 
“where there are reciprocal (although not symmetrical) costly effects of transactions, there is 
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interdependence” and “interdependence, mostly simply defined, means mutual dependence” 
(Keohane and Nye, 1989, p.8-9).   
Therefore, the use of hard power becomes less imperative between states with shared 
economic and political interests; Keohane and Nye stated explicitly that “military force could, 
for instance, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on economic issues” (Keohane and Nye, 
1989, p.25).  Many proponents of globalization have echoed this conception.  For example, 
Thomas Friedman’s tongue-in-cheek “Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention” claims that the 
interdependence of countries who work within the computer giant’s supply chain will never fight 
one another because they too heavily depend upon each other’s roles in the manufacturing 
process in order stimulate their economy and increase their standard of living, thus they would 
not sacrifice the benefits of interdependence for war (Friedman, 2005, p.421).     
Michael W. Doyle noted similar military constraint occurred in the 1800s when the 
dominant Europeans would allow African tribal leaders to dictate their own local policies 
because it was more beneficial to their imperial trade efforts than to costly enforce rules on every 
individual in a particular territory (Doyle, 1986, p.180-181).  In addition, Charles W. Kegley 
argues the unipolar moment for which the United States now benefits will not last, and the 
expected rise of multipolarity with future great and equal bodies like China, Japan, and the 
European Union will compel the United States to collaborate with these powers in order to 
prevent large-scale conflict (Kegley and Raymond 1994).  Therefore, according to these liberals 
it is imperative for the United States to work cooperatively and use its stature to lead 
international institutions in a way that will bring benefits to everyone.  As Robert Jervis once 
pointed out,  
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because there are no institutions or authorities that can make and enforce international 
laws, the policies of cooperation that will bring mutual rewards if others cooperate may 
bring disaster if they do not (Jervis, 1978, p.167).   
G. John Ikenberry asserts that since the beginning of America’s ascent the United States has 
taken strides towards cooperation, which has eased the worries of smaller powers, 
consequentially preventing a backlash.  He cites the formation of the UN, IMF, World Bank, and 
GATT as examples of ambitious institution-building the United States has previously undergone.  
And although “the price for the United States was a reduction in Washington’s policy autonomy, 
in that institutional rules and joint decision-making reduced U.S. unilateralist capacities,” he 
contends “what Washington got in return was worth the price” (Ikenberry, 2001, p.20).  
Ikenberry claims the current trend to shy away from multilateral organizations and focus on 
unilateral hard power approaches has made a less stable environment for which the United States 
can pursue its interests (Ikenberry, 2001, p.21).          
Soft Power 
Despite the importance of these liberal contentions, the most significant and recent contribution 
to international relations from the liberal camp has been Joseph Nye’s development of the soft 
power concept, which countered the mistaken perception that military power was everything.  
For example, consider the Vietnam War and the supremacy of the U.S. military compared to the 
North Vietnamese, although the United States had far more bombs, warplanes, and professional 
soldiers on the ground the United States still failed to achieve its objective.  In his 2002 book 
Paradox of American Power Nye quotes Washington Post correspondent Sebastian Mallaby who 
noted in 1999 that,  
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The paradox of American power at the end of this millennium is that it is too great to be  
challenged by any other state, yet not great enough to solve problems such as global  
terrorism or nuclear proliferation.  America needs the help and respect of other nations 
(Nye, 2002, p.40).   
Thus Nye enters the concept of soft power.  Although briefly mentioned in the introductory 
chapter and a more in-depth examination will be given in the subsequent chapter on 
methodology, an additional look at soft power is warranted here.  Hard power, as depicted above 
by the characterizations of Mearsheimer and Krauthammer is used by making inducements or 
threats.  Soft power on the other hand is “getting others to want the outcomes that you want – [it] 
co-opts people rather than coerces them” (Nye, 2004, p.5).  For instance, Nye uses the business 
world as a case in point; rather than a boss barking orders leadership can also involve “leading 
by example and attracting others to do what you want” (Nye, 2004, p.5).  As opposed to being 
commanded what to do, soft power operates through the power of attraction.  Popular culture, 
political ideals, and cultural exchanges can all be sources of soft power.  For example, the 
Association of International Educators has noted that “the millions of people who have studied in 
the United States over the years constitute a remarkable reservoir of goodwill for our country” 
(Nye, 2004, p.45).  Therefore, Nye would argue by attracting foreigners to American values it 
becomes far easier to influence policy on the international stage.   
However, soft power like hard power is not merely the same as influence because 
behavior can be shaped in non-soft methods as well.  Power is best understood by thinking of it 
as three-dimensional.  As E.H. Carr stated in The Twenty Years Crisis political power in the 
international arena can be divided into the groupings of military, economic, and power over 
opinion (Carr, 1964, p.108).  Nye reiterates that view by asserting that a three-dimensional 
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chessboard with a top layer dedicated to interstate military power, a middle layer of interstate 
economic issues, and on the bottom transnational resources (think soft power) should be the 
manner for which power is perceived in international affairs.     
Proponents and Opponents  
However, some have argued against the validity of the soft power concept.  Fouad Ajami, 
Director of the Middle East Studies Program at John Hopkins University, believes “the United 
States need not worry about hearts and minds in foreign lands” because if groups like Arab 
Muslims consider their “long winter of decline is the fault of the United States, no campaign of 
public diplomacy shall deliver them from that coherence” (Ajami, 2003, p.61).  Syndicated 
columnist Cal Thomas agrees and stated it to be “fiction that our enemies can be made less 
threatening by what America says and does” (Thomas, 2003, p.21).  Furthermore, there are some 
scholars against the policy implementation of soft power tactics.  For example, Daniel W. Fisk 
and Peter Rodman oppose cultural exchanges between the U.S. and the Cuban military because 
they see it impossible “to be sending signals for change of the regime while consorting with the 
security organs that maintain it;” they further state, “ostracism will have better pedagogical value 
than seminars at Harvard” (Independent Task Force, 2001, p.45). 
However, these critics of soft power tend to be small in number and are overshadowed by 
a much larger crowd who emphasize its use.  For example, Wendy W. Luers President and 
founder of the Foundation for a Civil Society believes it is important for the United States to 
expand cultural activities and exchanges including theater, dance, and the graphic arts in order to 
establish and solidify friendly bonds with people of other nations (Task Force Report, 2001, 
p.40).  Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara urged the use of multilateralism and 
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empathy to be included in America’s foreign relations in his 2001 coauthored book titled, 
Wilson’s Ghost.  He notes that the Vietnam War, a war for which he had a crucial hand in 
constructing, could have been prevented if the United States recognized the fact that none of its 
major allies supported the intervention; consequentially as a result the unilateral action hurt 
American prestige and influence (McNamara and Blight, 2001, p.53).  It is argued by the authors 
that if the United States were to behave in a more multilateral fashion or practice McNamara’s 
recommended policy of “zero-tolerance multilateralism” of never intervening unilaterally, this 
would encourage other nations to follow suit and consult with the United States, thus expanding 
the level of influence the United States would have in foreign affairs (McNamara and Blight, 
2001, p.233).  
Furthermore, German writer Josef Joffe commented in 2000 that American soft power 
was the reason why other smaller powers have not balanced America’s high stature as European 
nations had done to Napoleon’s ascendancy after 1793 (Joffe, 2000, p.6).  Joffe believes 
America’s attractive “culture, low-brow or high, radiates outward,” which is responsible for 
making the United States out to be a “bumbling” elephant rather than an “800-pound gorilla . . . 
in search of conquest and empire” (Joffe, 2001, p.43; and 2000, p.6).  However, in order to 
maintain this benevolent image Joffe urges that the United States must continue to do good for 
others and lead international institutions like NATO or risk the chance of becoming a target to be 
balanced (Joffe, 2000, p.6). 
Julia Sweig, mentioned in the introductory chapter for her theory of an 80/20 Divide is 
also a proponent of soft power.  She stresses the importance of America’s political ideals as a 
means to remain influential; “the best antidote to Anti-America may well come not from how we 
fight (or prevent) the next war but from the degree to which we keep intact the social contract 
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and international appeal of American society” (Sweig, 2006, p.212).  She notes that following 
FDR’s New Deal policies in America, many Latin Americans attempted to emulate the model in 
order to improve their impoverished societies (Sweig, 2006, p.6).  However, the current 
economic divide in the United States where middle class citizens are compelled to work longer 
hours to make ends meet causes the United States to no longer have some of the appeal that 
originally made the American dream so attractive to foreigners.  Therefore, Sweig worries the 
United States may be “loosing its claim to offer an economic model that truly promotes 
mobility,” which might provoke developing countries to look elsewhere for a viable model, thus 
generating a reduction in American influence (Sweig, 2006, p.77).   
Conclusion 
In summation, power in general has been interpreted differently between realists and liberals and 
thus the policy suggestions for the application of power tend to contrast as well.  In the third 
section of this chapter the reader will find a similar contrast between scholars and practitioners 
working in inter-American relations; for example, although there is near unanimous consent that 
the level of U.S. influence in the area is disconcerting, two camps emerge one advocating soft 
power the other a more hard-line approach.  However, before moving on to an examination on 
the status of the U.S. relationship with Latin America, an overview of foreign policy continuity 
and change is warranted.       
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Foreign Policy Continuity and Change 
Change and Adaptation  
The different approaches toward the concept of power taken by realists, liberals, and other 
scholars prompt an assessment of the literature pertaining to foreign policy continuity and 
change and the notion of unilateralism versus multilateralism.  This first section relates to the 
theoretical material on policy adaptation, in other words at what point does U.S. foreign policy 
stay the same and at what point does it change.     
Jerel A. Rosati contends that American politics, foreign policy in particular, tends to 
“resist” change unless it is interrupted by crisis (Rosati, 1999, p.570).  For example, the 
discontinuation of the containment strategy following the end of the Cold War.  Rosati explains 
political systems regardless if they are elitist or pluralist in nature obstruct change and favor the 
status quo to prevail because “established groups and institutions throughout government and 
society engage in politics to promote their interests and protect the status quo from challenging 
groups and ideas” (Rosati, 1999, p.570).  As V.O. Key noted, the established system can often 
work as a “powerful brake” to political change (Key, 1964, p.70).  Therefore, in order for real 
change other than incremental changes to occur Rosati claims a crisis or a moment of political 
instability must arise to alter the behavior of those involved in the construction of foreign policy.  
Rosati refers to this as a “period of transition” or “disequilibrium” as opposed to a “period of 
stability” that would simply promote policy continuity (Rosati, 1999, p.571). 
Public opinion is also worth noting in trying to understand foreign policy change.  The 
mass public tends to favor policy continuity in part for their preference for stability, but also due 
to their support for mainstream institutions and benefits.  As Robert Gilpin once remarked, “The 
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idea of radical changes that threatened accepted values and interests is not an appealing one” 
(Gilpin, 1981, p.6).  However, public opinion and the desire for a shift in policy can come about 
when the legitimacy of a political system is called into question by the populace.  Rosati notes 
that this occurs because of the “growing gap that develops between the incrementalist policies of 
the government and the inevitable change experienced throughout the global environment and 
society” (Rosati, 1999, p.571).  James N. Rosenau adds that when societies are not “under static 
conditions” political leaders are confronted with conditions at home that require them to adopt 
adaptation strategies (Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson, 1994, p.4).  Therefore, if adjustments are 
failed to be made to a changing international environment increased pressure and opposition 
mounts internally from members of society.  For additional scholarship on public opinion’s 
effect on foreign policy change one may wish to consult (Holsti 1996) which focuses on the post-
Cold War climate, or (Foyle 1999) who predicts the influence of public opinion wavers between 
different presidents.    
Charles Hermann noted there are four sources of foreign policy change: external shocks, 
domestic restructuring, bureaucratic advocacy, and leader-driven change (Hermann, 1990, p.3).  
External shocks can include crises, as mentioned above by Rosati’s theory, but specifically refer 
to external events such as the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  
Domestic restructuring is when a state undergoes dramatic alterations in its governmental 
structure, which triggers supplementary changes to the construction of foreign policy (i.e. the 
new Iraqi government).  Lastly, bureaucratic advocacy and leader-driven changes both consist of 
the different policies being pushed by those involved in making policy.  For example, the 
Communist Party in China choosing to make economic reforms rather than emphasize the 
projection of its military prowess, and the difference in foreign policy preference between the 
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2004 Bush and Kerry campaigns regarding unilateralism and multilateralism.  In addition to 
producing a valuable context to understand adaptation strategies, the extensiveness of Hermann’s 
model for sources of change is especially noteworthy because of the scant attention and overall 
focus the study of foreign policy change tends to receive.   
Robert Putnam’s theory regarding his notion of the two-level game theory is another such 
valuable study.  The two-level game theory states that politics at both the national and 
international level shape and produce international agreements.  As Putnam stresses, “it is 
fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the 
reverse” because it is mostly both (Putnam, 188, p.427).  Consider the hypothetical example that 
at the next G8 Summit one leader proposes reducing tariffs or even a free trade agreement 
amongst the other seven members.  At one level there would be debate between the G8 leaders 
on issues regarding timetables for when what would go into effect, and at the same time there 
would be internal politicking taking place between the President and Democrats and or 
Republicans about the various domestic implications.  Therefore, the final product or agreement 
of the proposed measure would be an outcome affected by the internal politics of each country as 
well as the politicking at the international level.  In this sense changes to foreign policy are 
controlled at two levels of negotiation; Putnam asserts, “The crucial point [is] that central 
decision-makers (“the state”) must be concerned simultaneously with domestic and internal 
pressures” (Putnam, 1988, p.431).      
Multilateralism Versus Unilateralism 
Putnam’s seminal work elucidates the factors of domestic and international constraints on 
foreign policy making, similar pressures are outlined by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in reference to 
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internationalism and isolationism, and also the use of unilateralism and multilateralism.  For 
instance, he notes the domestic difficulties from Congress that encumbered Woodrow Wilson 
and his desire to support the League of Nations (Schlesinger, 1995, p.3). Thus evidence that 
domestic politics or even who is president can affect the cooperative behavior of states.  
Schlesinger also asserts that changes at the systematic level can spur changes between the 
preferences of unilateralism versus multilateralism.  For example, he states,  
It is now surely clear that the upsurge in American internationalism during the Cold War 
was a reaction to what was seen as the direct and urgent Soviet threat to the security of 
the United States . . . The collapse of the Soviet threat faces us today with the prospect 
that haunted [Franklin] Roosevelt half a century ago – the return to the womb in 
American foreign policy . . . The Isolationist impulse has risen from the grave and taken 
the new form of unilateralism (Schlesinger, 1995, p.5).      
However, Schuller and Grant suggest unilateralism is merely an “ephemeral phase” for 
newfound and rather unchallenged superpowers because a state’s “interests cannot readily 
disentangle themselves from those of  . . . [its] partners and allies” (Schuller and Grant, 2003, 
p.44).  Expanding on that notion, Schuller and Grant refer to the work of German philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas who offers a theory rooted in sociology on the determining factors of 
multilateralism and unilateralism through his theory of communicative action.  Habermas asserts 
that it is actually the fluctuating interests of states that shape their choice of communicative 
techniques, or more precisely the decision whether or not to act unilaterally or multilaterally 
(Schuller and Grant, 2003, p.44-45).   Therefore, it should be understood that states make a 
strategic decision to involve or not to involve other states in their foreign policy actions.  For 
instance, when interests are narrow and focus primarily on the benefit of the American political 
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system U.S. unilateralism is preferred, whereas with broader goals multilateralism is sought 
after.  Therefore, in order to determine America’s true interests in invading Iraq one could apply 
Habermas’ theorem and determine that since there was not a genuine attempt towards 
multilateral support the actual interests of the United States were not to expand broader goals of 
peace and democracy, but something much narrower.  The theorem may also be applicable to 
U.S. policy towards Latin America to help explain why the United States has traditionally 
behaved unilaterally with its neighbors to the South.                    
 
The Relationship Status 
All together the theoretical scholarship regarding power (section one) and foreign policy changes 
(section two) does explain a great deal of why U.S. policy towards Latin America has stayed the 
same or changed over time.  For example, there have been moments of change due to crisis 
(Rosati’s theory); case in point the policy shift toward containment and intervention instigated by 
the start of the Cold War.  However, as a whole the nature of the relationship between the United 
States and Latin America has consistently been in a paltry state.  As Arthur P. Whitaker once 
noted, “the marriage of the two Americas ended in divorce before there was even a honeymoon” 
(Whitaker, 1954, p.41).  This section is an analysis of similar assessments of the U.S. Latin 
American relationship and the different approaches various scholars have advocated to rebuild 
what is widely recognized as a bad marriage.      
Misunderstanding and Neglect? 
Journalist and professor Henry Raymont has closely covered the relationship between Latin 
America and the United States over the past fifty years.  In his 2005 book titled, Troubled 
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Neighbors he concluded that a lack of understanding and genuine comprehension of Latin 
American affairs has caused the United States to implement ill-fated policies.  The combination 
of this lack of knowledge with paternalistic attitudes toward the region by America’s top 
policymakers Raymont believes is the cause for the existence of troubled neighbors.   
However, America’s cultural blindness to Latin America is by no means a former 
problem for which the United States is still paying the price for, but as Raymont demonstrates a 
continuous problem that darkens the history of inter-American relations as well as its current 
status today.  A classic example of this problem he recalls was shown by Ronald Reagan during 
a 1982 goodwill tour.  While at a state dinner in Brazil the U.S. president made a toast 
celebrating “the people of Bolivia” instead of Brazil (Raymont, 2005, p.249).  Reagan tried to 
explain he made the mistake because Bolivia was his next stop, however that explanation only 
worsened the problem when it was revealed that Colombia was actually the next destination on 
his agenda.  In general, Raymont notes that most presidents have had little experience in Latin 
American affairs, and because of this it has caused top policymakers to rely on assumptions and 
stereotypes of its southern neighbors rather than actual fact.  This lack of compassion and general 
understanding has ultimately led to paternalistic attitudes.  He argues, 
Starting with the notoriously prejudiced high school textbooks of the nineteenth century, 
it became a habit to disparage the countries south of the border.  It is a constant 
predicating of differences, from the old shibboleth that the southern half was colonized 
by gold grubbing, exploited and lazy Spaniards, while the north reaped virtues of the 
Puritan ethos that colored the life of its hard-working pilgrims (Raymont, 2005, p.308-
309).           
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This attitude of thinking ‘we know what’s best for you’ is supported by numerous policy 
examples.  For instance, Harold Molineu declared that it was actually the Monroe Doctrine that 
propelled this “paternalistic attitude in the United States toward the countries to the South” 
(Molineu, 1986, p.19).  Paternalism would be further politicized by Teddy Roosevelt’s 
international policeman policy that specifically called for the United States to intervene “in cases 
of [domestic] wrongdoing or impotence . . . in Central America and the Caribbean” (Perkins, 
1955, p.267).  Furthermore, the removal of democratically elected Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 
Guatemala and Salvador Allende in Chile by American covert operations additionally support 
this historic trend of paternalism.   
At the same time, Henry Raymont argues the United States often overlooks the problems 
for where it can be of assistance to its neighbors.  For example, even the normally empathetic 
Bill Clinton was accused of ignoring Latin America’s problems when at the 1994 Pan American 
summit his administration was criticized by other leaders for using the conference for domestic 
political gain and not caring “a fig about our [Latin America’s] needs” (Raymont, 2005, p.286).  
In an effort to revitalize the relationship Raymont suggests moving away from the unilateral and 
paternal past while increasing cultural understanding, effective leadership, and paying closer 
attention to Latin America as a whole.   
The issue of whether or not the United States is ignoring its southern counterparts has 
been thoroughly addressed by well known Latin Americanist and professor Howard J. Wiarda.  
Wiarda has asked whether or not U.S. behavior toward Latin America is one that reflects benign 
neglect.  His deduction is that American foreign policy is not necessarily one of neglect, but 
rather active engagement at “relatively low policy and bureaucratic levels” (Wiarda, 2006, 
p.101).  For example, at local, state, and regional areas of government as well as within civil 
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rights and human rights groups there is a degree of continual concentration on Latin American 
affairs.  This is supported by Arthur P. Whitaker’s 1954 assessment of the Hoover 
Administration. Whitaker commented that there was a conspicuous absence of Herbert Hoover 
from the policy development process towards the region, adding that for the most part Hoover 
simply left Latin American affairs to his Secretary of State Henry Stimson and other bureaucrats 
(Whitaker, 1954, p.136).  Wiarda would concur contending a great deal of U.S. foreign policy is 
conducted at lower policy levels out of sight from media attention, and that Latin America is 
only of concern to high policy levels during times of crisis.  However, similar to Henry Raymont 
Wiarda also argues American behavior tends to be “condescending and patronizing” and those in 
charge of U.S. policy typically “treat Latin Americans as ‘little children’ who must be educated” 
(Wiarda, 2006, p.86).  As the late Columbia professor Frank Tannenbaum once asserted, “Our 
difficulties with Latin America are not merely economic and political. They are moral” 
(Tannenbaum, 1966, p.176).  Therefore, the question really becomes whether or not the attention 
the United States does pay to the region is benign or malignant, and why Latin America is absent 
from the national agenda of America’s top policymakers. 
The Whirlpool and Placing Blame 
Robert A. Pastor, former director of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs at the National 
Security Council and current professor at American University in Washington D.C. refers to this 
problem as the whirlpool effect.  Pastor first developed the whirlpool concept in 1992; he argues 
the U.S. government presidents in particular get drawn into Latin American affairs when they 
become crises, but are released from this whirlpool when matters of more urgent concern arise 
elsewhere (Pastor, 2001, p.ix).  Thus, despite the intentions of the Washington Consensus and 
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the efforts of those at lower bureaucratic levels, U.S. foreign policy to Latin America is often 
piecemeal and without a consistent strategy.  This is similar to George Black’s claim in that,  
when there was no crisis, or when the crisis did not discreetly involve the United States, it 
was as if the [Latin American] country in question had simply ceased to exist (Black, 
1988, p.80).   
Anita Isaacs criticizes Pastor’s supposition on the basis that his findings are too heavily relied on 
case studies from Central America and the Caribbean (Isaacs, 1993, p.364).  However, the 
American involvement in removing Allende from power and current U.S. attention to the 
policies of Hugo Chávez suggest the whirlpool explanation does account for the South American 
continent as well.  In 2001, Pastor developed a strategy for the United States to exit this 
whirlpool phenomenon, stating the “consolidation of democracy and the expansion of freer 
trade” during the post-Cold War era as promising areas to build an engaging foreign policy to the 
region that stresses cooperation and continual collaboration between North and South (Pastor, 
2001, p.ix).     
At the same time Pastor asserts the United States should not be solely to blame for the 
troubled relationship with Latin America.  As Latin American historian Herbert L. Matthews 
once asserted, “it takes two to make a relationship as well as a quarrel” (Matthews, 1963, p.121).  
For example, the perceptions of sovereignty by many Latin American leaders have hindered a 
positive relationship from forming.  For instance, Mexico’s past leaders have often constructed 
walls around their country, whether it was a state-managed protectionist economic strategy or a 
dominant-party regime that preached anti-Americanism “psychological, diplomatic, and 
economic boundaries” separated the nation from the United States (Pastor, 2001, p.271).  Rather 
than rejecting the United States in the name of nationalism, Pastor is convinced countries in the 
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region should have been cooperating with the United States in efforts to improve their national 
well-being.  Therefore, Latin America’s failures in the past to confront the U.S. government have 
not only prolonged the whirlpool problem, but also makes Latin governments partially 
responsible for it.  In the end, the failures of both the United States and Latin American countries 
to work cooperatively together Pastor argues is one reason why a poor relationship exists and the 
United States has less influence in the region than it often perceives. 
However, Peter H. Smith and Lars Schoultz hold the United States almost solely 
responsible and attempt to demonstrate in each of their respected manuscripts that the history of 
U.S. policy driven by self-interest and corresponding hard power policies are to blame for bad 
relations and diminished U.S. influence.  Smith contends the dynamics of hemispheric affairs 
and the variation in the behavior of the United States can be understood by examining the 
geopolitics during the time the actions took place, including the changes in the definitions of 
U.S. national interest and the perceptions of extrahemispheric rivalry (Smith, 2000, p.357).  
Therefore, according to Smith while self-interest can be seen as the motivation for the often 
callous policy aimed at Latin America, the perception of events on the international stage have 
also stirred American course of action.  The prime example of this Smith claims is the 1954 
intervention into Guatemala where combined with the American economic interests tied to the 
United Fruit Company, Arbenz’s political left swing caused fear for U.S. policymakers that a 
Soviet led mission to spread communism throughout the Americas was underway (Smith, 2000, 
p.137).    
Lars Schoultz also regards U.S. policy to the region as one synonymous with self-interest.  
For Schoultz this self-interest has revolved around the three themes of national security, 
domestic politics, and economic development (Schoultz, 1998, p.xv).  The argument made is that 
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these three themes, which have been intertwined with American policy towards Latin America 
since the beginning of hemispheric relations, are supported and driven by a belief of cultural 
superiority over its southern neighbors, which Schoultz concludes is beneath the United States.  
For example, he recalls the belittling language used by President H.W. Bush against Nicaraguan 
President Daniel Ortega when Ortega’s domestic objectives became a thorn in the side of the 
U.S. government.  Bush publicly referred to Ortega as a “little man,” and when asked why he 
used such a scornful label Bush responded, “because he is - that’s why” (Schoultz, 1998, p.xi).  
His notion is that such attitudes have propelled the United States to behave unilaterally rather 
than respect its Latin American counterparts and work multilaterally with them.  For additional 
scholarship critical of the U.S. hard-line policy in Latin America one may turn to (Coatsworth 
1994) who makes the argument for the existence of a client-state scenario where the United 
States has provided protection in exchange for the authority to supervise Central America’s 
political and economic environment; or (Conniff 1992) for a specific case study analysis of past 
U.S. policy towards a Latin American country (i.e. Panama).           
Although there is variability in who is as at fault in a number of these works outlined 
above, the connection between Schoultz, Smith, Pastor, Wiarda, and Raymont rests on the 
cornerstone that something has gone terribly wrong in the relationship between the United States 
and Latin America.  The exceptionality of the New World that was supposed to solidify bonds 
separate from Europe they argue is one with many cracks and is in need of desperate repair.  In 
short many of these authors make the case for a revitalization of relations.  Furthermore, all of 
these writers believe a shift in policy away from the traditional hard-line approach would 
improve relations.  For Pastor, that would be working collectively on matters of democracy and 
trade as opposed to making unilateral demands that have historically pushed Latin American 
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countries away.  And for Raymont having a better understanding of Latin American culture, 
whether it is through the form of cultural exchanges or other practices would be the remedy to 
improve U.S. influence in the region.   
Staying the Course 
In contrast, there are a small number of detractors within the body of literature on inter-American 
relations who support maintaining the tradition of past policies, and if anything a shift to more 
hard-line policies they deem is more appropriate than the softer approaches like multilateralism 
advocated by the authors mentioned above.  
William Kristol, editor of the influential The Weekly Standard is well known for his neo-
conservatism and outlook on U.S. foreign policy in both Washington and academic circles.  
Although his writings tend to focus more on American foreign policy at large and not policy 
aimed directly at Latin America his opinions are often echoed by scholars and practitioners 
working in inter-American relations.  For example, in a 1996 article co-authored with Robert 
Kagan, Kristol argued that during the Reagan Administration “the policy of putting pressure on 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes had practical aims and, in the end, delivered strategic 
benefits” (Kristol and Kagan, 1998, p.27-28).  Today this hard-line stance is shared by those 
encouraging tougher policies against Cuban President Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chávez.  For instance, President Bush has tightened the travel ban for Americans wanting 
to travel to Cuba because he believes less tourist dollars equates to less money in the hands of the 
Castro government, thus making it more difficult for the regime to operate.  In addition, the 
White House supported a coup d'état that temporarily removed democratically elected Chávez 
from power (Isikoff and Contreras, 2002, p.10).  Kristol has also advocated regime change to be 
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carried out by the U.S. military; for instance at a 2002 conference on Middle Eastern affairs he 
agreed with former Director of the CIA James Woolsey that regime change should be the 
preferred policy of the United States to neutralize the growing threats to American security in 
Iran and Syria (Hearn, 2002, p.68).  One year later, Congressman Henry Hyde made similar 
policy suggestions for the U.S. stance towards Venezuela and Brazil, contending the United 
States should do the utmost to oust Hugo Chávez from power, giving further evidence to the fact 
that Kristol’s pro-hard power mentality has been influential for those working in inter-American 
relations (Corrigan, 2003, p.7).     
In addition to policymakers, scholars like Mark Falcoff of the American Enterprise 
Institute also advocate tough policies toward Latin America.  Prior to the Panama Canal 
handover, Falcoff warned that the departure of the American military authority in the country 
was “bound to have weighty consequences” and reminded his readers that Panama was not 
Switzerland or Luxembourg and the likelihood of civil unrest was probable (Falcoff, 1998, p.3).  
Therefore, according to Falcoff without the arm of the U.S. military to induce or make threats an 
unfriendly dictator could arise and end up controlling one of the most strategic locations on the 
planet consequently eliminating American influence.  
Susan Kaufman Purcell, vice-president of the Council of the Americas and the Americas 
Society, shares Falcoff’s hard-line views.  In a response to former Chief of the U.S. Interest 
Section in Havana Wayne S. Smith’s cry to lift the Cuban embargo as a stimulant to liberalize 
the state’s economy, she countered that Castro has only attempted to make economic reform 
when he is under more pressure not less.  She notes Castro was forced to make reforms when the 
Soviet Union collapsed and no longer could provide billions in subsidies as evidence that the 
embargo is working.  Purcell believes “deeper economic reforms will be forthcoming during the 
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next few years – not because Fidel Castro has embraced Adam Smith but because he has no 
choice” (Purcell, 1996, p.161).   
The different policies supported by the likes of Raymont and Pastor and that of Falcoff 
and Purcell fall on the fault lines of the soft power and hard power debate even though both 
camps do recognize a problem for U.S. influence in Latin America.  At the same time it is easy 
to see how the differences on this literature can be regarded as a sub clash to the larger 
ideological war between realists and liberals, at least in respect to how each advocates the 
application of power.  
Conclusion  
The body of literature on U.S. Latin American relations is entrenched with depictions of a 
troubled relationship, one for which clearly affects influence.  The examples from Robert Pastor, 
Howard Wiarda, and the others mentioned above are more than suffice to bring this point home.  
However, is it necessary for America to set an example for the rest of the world; or is it correct to 
assume that America’s enemies cannot be made less threatening by what it says or does?  
Furthermore, in respect to Latin America has the absence of soft power and multilateralism 
during past interactions been responsible for affecting American influence in a negative way?  
This thesis will answer such questions and attempt to determine if soft power approaches or 
more hard-line polices best predict and describe U.S. influence in Latin America.   
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY  
 
 
The purpose of this study is to compare two historical cases of U.S. foreign policy power 
approaches and to determine the effect each method has had on American influence in the Latin 
American region.  Representing the soft power and hard power approaches will be the Good 
Neighbor policy and the contra war in Nicaragua, respectively.  The case study comparison and 
the final analysis will be conducted in a qualitative fashion.  Unfortunately this poses a variety of 
problems.  For starters, “as a general rule, qualitative studies do not [typically] allow the 
researcher to identify cause-effect relationships” (Leedy and Ormond, 2005, p.135).  However, 
in this study both the independent and dependent variables are concepts that are beyond the reach 
of quantifying.  In fact, soft power, hard power, and influence are even difficult to operationalize 
as qualitative variables because of the vagueness and abstractness each encompasses.  Therefore, 
it is my objective in this chapter to clarify as best as possible the bounds for which each term 
represents during this study in order to make a comparison possible between the two selected 
cases and to deduce whether or not different power approaches have different effects on 
influence.  The final section of this chapter will address the general research strategy, in terms of 
why the employment of the case study comparison method is best for this thesis.                       
If the end result of this analysis were to find dramatic differences in the level of influence 
gained or lost from a particular power approach it would certainly beget further research and 
even the possible development of a theory that claims X causes Y.  However, it should be noted 
that Barbara Geddes (2003) warns about the dangers of forming elaborate theories that do not 
hold up because of poorly constructed research design.  She uses the metaphor of sandcastles to 
illustrate this problem.  For example, she states that often researchers will build paradigms with 
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great effort only to see them washed away like sand castles by “the next generation of graduate 
students, whose research batters at the weak points” (Geddes, 2003, p.4).  Certainly this study if 
not designed properly could fall susceptible to scientific scrutiny or what Geddes would refer to 
as a rising tide to my supposition.  Therefore, this chapter’s intent is to present the details of my 
research design in an effort to persuade the reader that a sound research structure has been 
erected to sufficiently develop valid conclusions that will withstand the weather of any design 
criticism.          
 
Population and Variables 
This chapter’s first section will concentrate on the difficulties of the study’s population and 
variables so that in section two a basis has been formed for explaining the general research 
strategy.  Foremost, the abundance of literature describing the difficulties within the U.S. Latin 
American relationship (Raymont 2005, Smith 2000, Schoultz 1998, Pastor 1992, Wiarda 1987) 
compels an examination of U.S. foreign policy to be conducted.  Moreover, the rise of 
intermestic issues that involve Latin America further add to the importance of the region to 
American interests, thus the significance of its inclusion in this study.  In regards to reliability, 
using cases only from Latin America helps control for a handful of variables that might also 
affect influence; for example, similar history in terms of frontier and colonial pasts, the shared 
experience of independence and former U.S. policies (i.e. Big Stick, Dollar Diplomacy), as well 
as related economics and culture.  Whereas comparing two events such one from Southeast Asia 
and another from the Middle East would not necessarily garner similar advantages.    
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However, there is a challenge to using the method of a case study comparison for events 
that have occurred within two very different historical eras.  For example, the contra war in 
Nicaragua was during the bipolar Cold War where the international context of events was very 
different than the geopolitics of the 1930s and early 1940s.  In that sense one may argue that this 
difference in geopolitics could account for variation in the amount of influence gained or lost 
following each of these power approaches.  However, it is more likely that events on the 
international stage propelled what types of power approaches the United States chose to employ 
rather than the effect of how much influence was eventually gained or lost.  Furthermore, it is 
important to remind the reader that the significance of this study is to compare two strong cases 
of hard and soft power.  The Good Neighbor policy and the contra war examples were selected 
for their polarity, and although they each occurred during different historical periods they should 
provide a suffice sample in order to make a deduction on whether or not soft power or hard 
power is a better technique to make use of in order to acquire and maintain influence in Latin 
America. 
Influence 
My dependent variable was not addressed in any detail in the previous chapter; and since it is 
intangible and quite vague it would be prudent to lay out my thinking about the term influence in 
order to understand the basis of where my operational definition comes from.   After all it is 
crucial that the investigation is “measuring what we think we are measuring,” and therefore 
equally imperative for the reader to understand the exact phenomena being investigated (King, 
Keohane, Verba, 1994, p.25).   To begin with it should be noted that the words authority, control, 
and power are often used interchangeably for influence.  However, for this project influence is 
 40
the more accurate term to describe the phenomena I am investigating.  For example, “authority is 
something that can only emerge in legitimate relationships which do not exist between states” 
(Brown, 2001, p.87).  In other words, Latin American countries do not acknowledge that the 
United States has a right to exercise authority over it.  Furthermore, the concept ‘control’ is also 
an inaccurate term used to describe influence because in order for one state to be in a position to 
control another, “the latter would cease to be a state” (Brown, 2001, p.88).  Therefore, as 
Professor Chris Brown explains, since  
“we have neither a world government (a world source of legitimate authority) nor a world 
empire (a world-wide source of effective control) . . . only relationships of influence 
remain” (Brown, 2001, p.88).   
The word ‘power’ is more closely related to influence than authority or control, but it is still not 
the precise word to employ.  As noted in the previous chapter, there are a variety of power 
methods a state can use to acquire influence, but none should be considered to guarantee or 
equate to influence.  Power should be understood as a method or a tool because certain types of 
power can fail to compel, deter, or attract another actor.  Influence on the other hand is the 
outcome of achieving compliance, deterrence, or attraction.  Therefore, for my thesis influence 
should be understood as a successful outcome.  The verdict of whether or not influence had 
increased or decreased is measured by the ability to achieve desired objectives.  This similar 
method has been used by political scientists determining the effectiveness of economic sanctions 
(Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1985).  Furthermore, the level of difficulty in accomplishing such 
goals and the success rate of attaining particular objectives determines how much influence a 
state possesses.  
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The manner for measuring the amount of influence the United States possesses will be 
done qualitatively by examining the objectives the United States was attempting to reach just 
prior, during, and after the Good Neighbor and contra war policies took place in Latin America.  
By doing this it will reveal the difference in difficulty (if any) in trying to accomplish those 
goals.  It is certainly possible that after the length of time each approach stretched out to be, the 
goals before the event may have changed and became something different than what they were 
beforehand.  Nevertheless, a measure of influence can still be extracted from a comparison of the 
fluctuating challenges of meeting those various goals.    
Soft Power and Hard Power 
The independent variables can be equally as challenging to operationalize.  As explained in the 
previous chapter soft power is the ability to get what you want through the act of persuasion 
rather than coercion, it is the practice of using attraction to shape the behavior of others rather 
than making explicit threats.  However, there are a number of ways one can persuade others to 
go along with one’s own objectives.  Therefore, in order to understand where this study’s 
operational definition of soft power comes from a short examination of soft power resources and 
indicators is warranted.   
For this thesis the indicators of public diplomacy including cultural exchanges, bilateral 
and multilateral diplomacy, and the degree to which the United States had lived up to its own 
standards and popular political ideals are used to classify the concept of soft power.  Each of 
those soft power indicators can be found in the Good Neighbor case and for that reason its 
inclusion into this study case is valuable.  For example, the emphasis on cooperation, 
nonintervention, and public diplomacy through a variety of mediums was done with the purpose 
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of building a magnet towards Latin America in hopes to attract America’s southern neighbors to 
broader U.S. goals and objectives.  A more exhaustive look at the Good Neighbor case’s ability 
to exemplify the soft power approach will be laid out in chapter four. 
Hard power is the second independent variable of my thesis.  In general, hard power rests 
on the utilization of inducements, commands, coercion, or threats, which can involve a variety of 
techniques other than simply military prowess.  For this project military force or war, economic 
sanctions and payments (in the form of bribes), and coercive diplomacy serve as the indicators 
for the phenomena of hard power for which I am trying to capture in this study.  The contra war 
case in Nicaragua resembles the hard power approach because of its emphasis on military 
intervention and economic pressure; for example, Ronald Reagan’s efforts to fund guerilla forces 
to overthrow the established Sandinista government because of its leftist political position.  A 
further examination of how the contra war fits the hard power approach will be carried out in 
chapter five.   
In total, hard power for this study is considered the use of military force or war, economic 
sanctions and payments, and/or coercive diplomacy, being employed by a particular state; as 
opposed to the indicators of public diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, and 
attractive political ideals for soft power.  In the subsequent chapters a great deal of effort will be 
given to explaining how the Good Neighbor and contra war cases exemplify the parameters laid 
out here for these independent variables before analyzing the effect each had on American 
influence in Latin America.         
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The Exclusion of Economic Power and Other Remarks 
A short discussion of economic power is necessary not merely to justify why it was not included 
as a third independent variable, but to give further clarification of the conceptual bounds of soft 
power and hard power in this study.  In general, economic power is both soft and hard power; 
depending on how economic power is used determines if it is a hard or soft approach.  Although 
I concede to the notion that the possession of power should be viewed on a three dimensional 
chessboard, I do not believe there are more than two approaches to applying those three forms of 
power.  For example, when a nation uses its economic power to place sanctions or an embargo 
on another country it reflects a hard approach, but when a country uses its vast wealth to provide 
economic relief and assistance (without any strings attached) it is using a soft approach.  
Therefore, I find the two models of hard power and soft power to be sufficient variables in 
capturing the essence of foreign policy approaches I wish to examine in this academic exercise.    
At the same time it should be mentioned that the Good Neighbor and contra war cases are 
worthy examples for this study because each often behaves counter to the other’s power 
approach.  For example, Ronald Reagan carrying out the contra war surreptitiously from 
Congress may not be a form of hard power by the means of coercion or deterrence, but it does 
goes against the attractive political ideal of transparency, a trait of soft power.  In addition, the 
policy of nonintervention and the refusal to use armed force to secure various political objectives 
in Latin America during the Good Neighbor era is not soft because it is power through attraction, 
but rather because it is counter to the hard power approach of armed force.  Therefore, some 
qualities of both the Good Neighbor and the contra war cases are soft and hard power by default 
because they contradict the other’s traits.  The ability for these case examples to do so is an 
additional advantage of their inclusion in this study.      
 44
Research Strategy  
In sum, the methodology of this study is a qualitative comparison of two U.S. foreign policy 
cases.  The Good Neighbor policy and the contra war in Nicaragua represent the soft and hard 
power approaches, respectively.  The main strategy to conduct this qualitative study is a 
document analysis.  Through an examination of articles, speeches, and actual legislation 
concerning each of the two cases the depth to which the Good Neighbor policy and the contra 
war in Nicaragua represent the soft and hard power approaches can be revealed.  Furthermore, by 
using foreign newspapers, speeches by Latin American leaders and other elites, as well as journal 
articles and memoirs that not only assess the influence of U.S. policy, but also display the 
sentiment towards each of the cases in question, it provides the keys to uncovering the level of 
difficulty in achieving various U.S. objectives in the region; therefore revealing whether there 
was a gain or loss in influence.  For those reasons the implementation of a document analysis is 
greatly beneficial.           
The advantages of using a historical comparative case study method for this particular 
research question lie in its ability to concentrate on depth rather than breadth.  By focusing on 
two specific cases it becomes possible to investigate the Good Neighbor and contra war instances 
in greater detail.  In general case studies also help answer the “how” and “why” questions (Yin 
2003), for example one of the general questions in this study asks why U.S. influence fluctuates 
in Latin America.  Furthermore, in contrast to experimental designs where the conditions and 
environment are highly controlled, a lack of complete control over the context can be beneficial 
by allowing real life events to play out.  As some political scientists have stated, it can show 
“that a theory actually works and is applicable in a real situation” (Johnson, Joslyn, and 
Reynolds, 2001, p.86).  This can also be important for testing theories involved with government 
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policies and programs, which in effect this thesis project is attempting to do.  In recent years 
some have promoted the use of case studies to develop policy-relevant theories that are 
beneficial to policymakers (George and Bennett 2005).      
However, there are limitations to utilizing the case study method.  To begin with case 
studies are seldom completed in a short period of time because they require extensive data 
collection and adequate documentation (Johnson, Joslyn, and Reynolds, 2001, p.84).  
Furthermore, there is the potentiality for bias to occur; after all “no one asks a question unless 
there is an interest in what the conclusion might be” (Hoover and Donovan, 2004, p.9).  This is a 
logical criticism and in fact it is often the complaint from proponents of quantitative studies who 
never fail to remind those in qualitative work that numbers never lie.  However such individuals 
seem to forget bias can also occur in conducting experimental research (Rosenthal 1966).  To 
assist with the drawback of possible bias I have chosen to include a variety of scholarly 
assessments concerning the impact of each policy case on U.S. influence in Latin America; this 
will account for any unforeseeable personal bias.  Despite some limitations the case study 
method does provide a snap shot of history and permits a “deeper understanding of the causal 
process” (Johnson, Joslyn, and Reynolds, 2001, p.88).  In this regard the Good Neighbor policy 
and the contra war cases will reveal the causal effect of soft and hard power on influence.  
The specific case selection of the Good Neighbor policy and the contra war are important 
because they represent the extremes of the soft and hard power approaches in foreign policy.  For 
example, as elucidated above each case reflects the polar ends of what could be considered the 
soft and hard power continuum.  This is an essential component of the study because the 
underlying purpose of the thesis is to compare and contrast the two types of power tactics in the  
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Latin America setting.  The selection of alternative cases that do not fully represent the qualities 
of soft and hard power would allow the possibility of one to make an inference about the effects 
of soft and hard power that are simply not valid.  Furthermore, the examination of the Good 
Neighbor and contra war cases permits a greater understanding of the effects of U.S. policy in 
Latin America.  As stated earlier in the chapter the rise of intermestic issues that involve Latin 
America have added to the importance of this region to American interests.  In terms of applying 
power, these two specific cases offer two very different methods for which U.S. policymakers 
can adopt to tackle these contemporary issues.   
However, that does not mean the methods or findings of this study are not applicable 
elsewhere.  The current situation in Iraq provides an example for where policymakers have made 
the choice between implementing soft and hard power.  In addition, the current state of relations 
with China, North Korea, and Iran provide further areas for the discussion on the two power 
approaches in U.S. foreign policy.  These examples illustrate this study’s ability to account for 
external validity.  For instance, in the case of Iran one could replicate my study by examining 
past U.S. policies to the country that reflect the characteristics of soft and hard power (i.e. the 
late 1800s’ diplomatic efforts versus the 1953 overthrow).  By doing so it could provide an 
answer to which approach towards the country was more beneficial in acquiring influence, and 
thus help decide whether the United States should now be more forceful or diplomatic.   
Moreover, the results of the study will be significant to the Latin American region.  The 
pending predicament in Cuba with the imminent death of Fidel Castro will in all likelihood result 
in a change of U.S. policy to the country.  The results of this case study analysis on the 
comparison of the Good Neighbor policy and the contra war could serve as an indication for 
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what type of power approach to implement.  In that regard the methodology chosen for this 
project is invaluable.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY 
 
 
The Good Neighbor policy is the name used to describe Franklin D. Roosevelt’s foreign policy 
strategy towards Latin America.  Although it was actually Herbert Hoover who first used the 
phrase “good neighbor” the philosophy has become a part of FDR’s distinct legacy (Black, 1988, 
p.59).  At his 1933 inauguration speech there was not a great deal of text dedicated to 
international relations, but what did refer to the new president’s foreign policy intentions was a 
clear shift in course from past administrations’ policies in the Western hemisphere: 
In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the Good 
Neighbor, the neighbor who respects the rights of others; the neighbor who respects his 
obligations and respects the sanctity of agreements in and with a world of neighbors.  We 
now realize as we have never realized before our interdependence on each other; that we 
cannot merely take, but must also give (Black, 1988, p.59).  
Therefore, Roosevelt’s vision for future relations between the United States and Latin America 
was to be one synonymous with the characteristics of soft power.  In order to illustrate this 
drastic change in approach towards Latin America a brief summary of the policies leading up to 
FDR’s Good Neighbor policy along with the state of influence the United States held prior to the 
implementation of Roosevelt’s plan is requisite.    
Preceding Policies 
The Good Neighbor approach contrasts greatly from those before it.  For example, Taft’s Dollar 
Diplomacy was intended to use American economic power, with or without Latin American 
agreement, to improve the conditions in the region in order to prevent a climate of vulnerability 
 49
that would attract European nations to step in and interfere with the so-called U.S. sphere of 
influence.  It was as Henry Raymont called it a “belief that U.S. investment was the recipe for 
political stability in the region” (Raymont, 2005, p.17).  However, as a consequence this 
triggered intermittent U.S. military intervention into the domestic affairs of Latin American 
republics in the name of protecting American dollars.   
For example, the U.S. government believed that revolutions in Central America were due 
to the actions of foreign financers not social conditions, thus sending troops into places like 
Nicaragua in 1926 was viewed as a necessity to enforce the Monroe Doctrine and protect 
American interests.  In fact, prior to the Good Neighbor policy there was little respect for the 
sovereignty of Latin American countries.  Between 1898 and 1920 alone U.S. troops entered the 
territory of Caribbean states on no less than twenty separate occasions, and in 1924 U.S. Marines 
were sent to Honduras according to one government telegram to protect the “American colony” 
(Wood, 1961, p.5).  Past interventions were often justified as a means to protect Americans and 
American owned property overseas.  As President Calvin Coolidge saw it in 1927, “The person 
and property of a citizen are a part of the general domain of the Nation, even when abroad” 
(Guerrant, 1950, p.114).    
The Platt Amendment to the Army Appropriation Act of 1901 exhibits the lengths the 
U.S. government was willing to go to enforce its will on Latin American countries prior to 
Roosevelt’s new approach.  Article III of the amendment, which was required to be incorporated 
into the Cuban constitution, stated that, “The Government of Cuba consents that the United 
States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence” (Wood, 
1961, p.49).  Therefore, the United States could intervene into Cuban affairs at its own 
discretion.  Until the abrogation of the Platt Amendment this would occur several times, 
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including in incidents of election fraud.  For example, between 1906 and 1909 the United States 
had installed an interim president of Cuba.   
U.S. intervention throughout Latin America was received disapprovingly and considered 
nothing more than Yankee interference and imperialism from their North American neighbor.  
One historian recalled that during this era, “In all of the Latin American countries there were 
strong feelings of distrust, suspicion, and fear of the alien nation of the north” (Wood, 1961, p.4).  
In addition, there was a lack of cooperation and respect towards the region to try to work with 
them.  In 1912 U.S. marines landed on the shores of the Dominican Republic to enforce the 
payment of international debts the country owed; furthermore U.S. officials stayed to ensure the 
election of a Dominican president who would be in line with American objectives (Molineu, 
1986, p.45).  As a result anti-American sentiment sprouted as it would again in the mid 1960s 
when the United States chose to intervene in the Dominican Republic once more.  
At times anti-American sentiment would compel Latin American nations to look 
elsewhere either for political/economic security or inspiration, which in turn affected U.S. 
influence.  For example, it is implausible to suggest the anti-American sentiment that ran 
rampant through Mexico for generations following the Mexican American War had no impact on 
Germany’s decision to try and draw Mexico into the First World War against the United States.  
This is also visible with the attempts of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to maintain financial ties 
with European states and institutions than to be trapped by American banks (Green, 1971, p.7).  
During this time the appeal of American style democracy and market capitalism declined evident 
from the scores of promising young Latin American students in the 1920s falling under the 
influence of Marxist economics, and the rise of dictatorships in Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina all 
by 1930 (Green, 1971, p.9).  The New World exceptionalism that was supposed to avoid those 
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European like troubles for which the United States was hoping to be the benevolent leader of was 
not on the horizon in the early 1930s.  As a whole, the situation was bleak for the United States 
to achieve policy objectives in the region, as FDR’s Secretary of State Hull recalled, “Our 
inheritance of ill-will was grim” (Hull, 1948, p.308).      
The Good Neighbor policy was designed to be a break from those past foreign policy 
approaches.  In 1928 Roosevelt proclaimed, “Single-handed intervention by us in the internal 
affairs of other nations must end; with the cooperation of others we shall have more order in this 
hemisphere and less dislike” (Roosevelt, 1928, p.585).  The following section is an outline of 
how the Good Neighbor policy case fits the characteristics of soft power stated in the previous 
methodology chapter; the final section is an analysis of how FDR’s Good Neighbor strategy 
affected U.S. influence.      
 
The Good Neighbor Policy as Soft Power 
The Good Neighbor policy approach is in accordance with the soft power components outlined 
in the literature review and methodology chapters.  The effort to work bilaterally and 
multilaterally with Latin American countries, the push to extend public diplomacy, the 
dedication to stand by popular American political ideals, and the strong emphasis on 
nonintervention exhibits the manner in which the Good Neighbor strategy was attempting to use 
the power of persuasion to gain influence.  This section will address these tactics in greater 
detail.        
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Nonintervention and Political Ideals 
The plan to not use war or armed force reflects the non-hard power qualities of FDR’s intentions, 
and as a centerpiece of his overall strategy for Latin America nonintervention deserves some 
attention.  As Secretary of the Navy FDR actually favored U.S. intervention as a foreign policy 
tool in Latin America, however it should have been no surprise that by the time of his presidency 
he had reversed his position and intended to usher in a new approach.  For example, quoted 
above in the previous section’s last paragraph is an excerpt from his 1928 article written for 
Foreign Affairs, for which Roosevelt stated, “Single-handed intervention by us in the internal 
affairs of other nations must end” (Roosevelt, 1928, p.585).  During his first year in office he 
would continue such statements to exhibit his non-coercive intentions; “the definite policy of the 
United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention” (Raymont, 2005, p.43).  
Words turned into action when in 1934 the Platt Amendment was terminated at the delight of 
both Cubans and members of the Roosevelt Administration.  Sumner Welles, the Assistant 
Secretary of State, had said there was “no greater impediment to the free exercise of the people” 
than what Platt had done (Guerrant, 1950, p.3).  The Good Neighbor policy was therefore to be a 
new course.   
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there were tense moments where U.S. intervention 
seemed like the perceptible policy.  For example, months after Roosevelt became president 
economic and political instability in Cuba was rising to the brink of revolution.  However, 
whereas previous administrations under the Platt Amendment would have put U.S. Marines on 
the ground to stabilize the situation and protect American owned property, the Roosevelt team 
chose another option.  When confronted by hawkish reporters with the notion of intervening or 
demanding then Cuban leader Gerardo Machado to step down, Roosevelt simply responded, 
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“That would be obvious interference with the internal affairs of another nation” (Wood, 1961, 
p.64).  In fact, the visual threat of American Naval ships off the Cuban coast was about as close 
as the Roosevelt Administration would get to applying hard power in Latin America.  FDR 
handled the Cuban situation with cautious diplomatic skill and a show of respect to the Cuban 
people to settle their own affairs without the United States dictating their every move.   
Other intense events that pressured FDR to interfere occurred in Bolivia and Mexico, 
both pertaining to oil.  For Mexico interference included the coercive diplomacy used by the U.S. 
government to favor North American oil companies.  However, even in this area the new 
administration was more neighborly than those before it.  For example, when U.S. ambassador to 
Mexico Josephus Daniels was pressured by private interests to make a formal protest against a 
proposed amendment to the Mexican constitution that would affect foreign investors, he refused 
claiming it would contravene U.S. commitments made at the 1933 Montevideo conference, 
stating:  
The Good Neighbor policy calls for patience, toleration, justice, mutual helpfulness.  Like 
Democracy, it can be purchased only at a heavy price, but no other policy can be upheld 
by a nation which respects the sovereignty of small countries and believes in self-
determination (Wood, 1961, p.165).           
A similar temptation of intervention occurred at the end of the 1930s where the U.S. government 
was pressured to intervene in the dispute between the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and 
the Bolivian government.  However, by restraining their role to that of an intermediary the 
United States was able to prevent violating the Good Neighbor policy (Smith, 2000, p.75-76).  
Years later historian Bryce Wood (1961, p.157) would call the approach to Mexico and Bolivia 
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“the policy of Pacific Protection.”  In sum, the Cuban, Mexican, and Bolivian examples further 
illustrate Roosevelt’s dedication to the soft power approach.    
As mentioned above, in 1933 there was an inter-American conference held in 
Montevideo, Uruguay, which in part addressed the issue of foreign intervention.  The 
representatives at the meeting were able to concur on a resolution; Article VIII asserted, “No 
state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another” (Smith, 2000, p.69).  
U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull (quoted in Smith, 2000, p.69) further vowed that, “no 
government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt 
administration.”  Hull’s words meant that the United States was renouncing the use of force in 
regards to interfering with the domestic political affairs of Latin America.  However, there was 
still some fear amongst Latin American leaders that the United States would continue to utilize 
its armed forces to protect their citizens or property if they perceived the smallest of government 
infractions put them in harm’s way.         
The FDR Administration was able to ease some of this anxiety at the 1936 Buenos Aires 
conference, where a formal protocol was adopted making intervention “inadmissible . . . in the 
internal or external affairs” of other countries (Matthews, 1963, p.135).  This move by Roosevelt 
was a complete rejection of the hard power approach laid out by his distant cousin Teddy in the 
Roosevelt Corollary.  When the United States agreed to nonintervention, political scientist Peter 
H. Smith contends this meant the United States was now abstaining from,  
any form of meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign states – through coercion, 
enticement, manipulation, or other means that might range from unsought advice to 
economic pressure to the threat or show of force (Smith, 2000, p.70).   
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Therefore, Roosevelt was dedicated to the notion of nonintervention and the absence of hard 
power tactics in his approach.  
The act of nonintervention was also not only a shift in policy towards Latin America but 
a representation of the long-standing American ideal of self-determination.  As described in both 
the literature review and methodology chapters the attractiveness of various political ideals can 
serve as an important tool of soft power.  The Roosevelt Administration’s foreign policy stance 
to forbid interference was compounded with attractive domestic policies, which created an 
environment open to imitation throughout the region.  For example, the domestic aims of the 
New Deal provided an example for Latin American nations to follow.  The New Deal, designed 
to assist the common folk, a group the born aristocrat Roosevelt did his best to identify with, 
helped the president gain esteem around the world.  According to historian John Patrick Diggins, 
“No other American president has so deeply touched the lives of the American people as 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt” (Diggins, 1988, p.10).  As it will be discussed later in the chapter, 
this sense of empathy for the downtrodden and the New Deal policies that were created to lift 
people up from oppression also created admiration and replicated strategies in Latin America 
that were inline with overall American policies.          
 
Multilateralism 
In addition to the policy of nonintervention, the series of inter-American meetings brought a 
climate of general cooperation and multilateralism to the table that had not been conveyed by 
previous American presidential administrations.  Assessing the situation historian Bryce Wood 
wrote, “The meetings of foreign ministers gave the governments of all Latin American countries 
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a sense of participation in the framing of certain decisions affecting the hemisphere as a whole” 
(Wood, 1961, p.338).  Considering the policies preceding Roosevelt’s tenure, this new 
relationship was a critical shift in course for American foreign policy.   
In fact, the Montevideo and Buenos Aires conferences as well as those to follow were a 
direct step towards multilateralism.  For instance, at the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference there 
was a resolution passed that called for the American states to “consult together for the purposes 
of finding and adopting methods of peaceful cooperation” (Smith, 2000, p.69).  Also proposed 
by the Americans at Buenos Aires was an inter-American system of collective consultation, 
which would later be cemented at two separate conferences held in Rio de Janeiro.  At the 1942 
meeting held in Rio there was a successful agreement on a regional defense pact, a few years 
later again in Rio diplomats signed the Inter-American Treaty of Peace and Security (Raymont, 
2005, p.31).  In all there would be six meetings of foreign ministers held between 1933 – 1944 
demonstrating FDR’s desire for multilateralism in the hemisphere.   
These rounds of talks on cooperation eventually gave way to expanding trade.  
Roosevelt’s Secretary of State Cordell Hull believed trade liberalization would not only expand 
the market for U.S. products, but would also diminish the tendency toward conflict; similar to the 
argument made by Keohane and Nye (1989) forty years later.  From 1929 to 1932 American 
exports to Latin America declined by 78% and imports declined 68%, in part because of the 
Hoover approved Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 (Smith, 2000, p.72).  In 1934 the 
government now under Roosevelt passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, which paved the 
way for bilateral trade arrangements with Latin American countries.  The intent was to improve 
the U.S. economy, but it also showed Latin Americans that the United States was willing to 
make some concessions to nationalism in the region by ignoring some of the immediate interests 
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of private investors.  As a whole, the wave of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements 
produced a by-product of increased interactions between Latin American countries and the 
United States, creating a sense of cooperation atypical from past administrations.  Therefore, the 
rounds of inter-American meetings to build a trusting partnership and the cooperative trade 
agreements were a new and less unilateral approach to American foreign policy in the region.       
Public Diplomacy  
As noted in the previous chapter public diplomacy can consist of various components from 
cultural exchanges and strategic communication to establishing lasting relationships.  The 
following section is a display of the Roosevelt Administration’s attempt at public diplomacy.        
Daily contacts as well as the establishment of lasting relationships are significant parts of 
public diplomacy because they construct the groundwork for trust and agreement on future 
policy decisions.  The shift to build a cordial relationship with Latin American nations was a new 
direction for the United States under Franklin Roosevelt.  Roosevelt was once quoted as having 
said that if he had been a Latin American during the decades preceding his presidency he “could 
not have been anything but an enemy of the United States” (Wood, 1961, p.323).  This display of 
empathy was a fresh approach to the region, also one in-line with the soft power trait Robert 
McNamara has recently argued for in the formation of modern day foreign policy.   
Between the time of the installment of the Good Neighbor policy and 1945 seventeen 
Latin American presidents or presidents elect were invited to Washington D.C. (Raymont, 2005, 
p.64).  And during the 1939 World’s Fair in New York City while numerous heads of state found 
their way to New York and Washington, it was Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza García that 
received the warmest welcome.  Roosevelt went as far as to personally greet Somoza at the 
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railway station, hold a military parade in his honor, and then lastly have the celebratory day end 
for Somoza with a night’s stay at the White House (Wood, 1961, p.155).  George Black recalled 
that it was the “most extravagant military reception the city has ever given a foreign leader” 
(Black, 1988, p.70-71).  The event was just one example of Roosevelt’s new diplomatic 
approach to Latin Americans.     
In fact, it has been said that the entire Roosevelt team implemented the Good Neighbor 
policy with a “finesse and a sympathetic style of application,” one that strived on an “informal 
atmosphere of communication between governments” ultimately allowing “growth of cordiality 
and respect among individuals” to flourish (Wood, 1961, p.337).  For example, during the 1933 
Montevideo Conference Cordell Hull practiced a form of shuttle diplomacy by going back and 
forth between the hotel rooms of the conference delegates.  By doing so Bryce Wood claims, “he 
opened a new era of warm personal relationships that contrasted sharply with the coldness and 
hostility” of previous American diplomats (Wood, 1961, p.304).  Sumner Welles, the Assistant 
Secretary of State, was involved with the day-to-day policy decisions of the larger Good 
Neighbor policy.  Welles had even regularly invited diplomats to his home establishing what one 
author had called the “second State Department” (Green, 1971, p.161).  By handling his post in 
this manner he was able to develop a large number of personal friendships throughout the region 
and within the American bureaucratic arm dedicated to Latin American affairs (Wood, 1961, 
p.340).  As a whole developing lasting relationships was a crucial goal to Roosevelt’s foreign 
policy makers. 
At the 1933 Montevideo conference American delegates also concurred on resolutions 
that were designed to bring about “mutual knowledge and understanding of the peoples of the 
Americas” (Smith, 2000, p.81).  Prior to Roosevelt’s efforts to develop cultural contacts with 
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Latin America there was little interest or effort from the U.S. government to promote American 
culture or ideas overseas.  As Fred Fejes notes, “While the Latin Americans tended to recognize 
the material progress and economic power of the United States, they looked to Europe as the 
source of cultural values and models” (Fejes, 1986, p.72).  It was under the Good Neighbor 
policy that this would change and American culture would begin to be used as a foreign policy 
tool.  For example, the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between 
the American Republics (OCCCRBAR) was created in 1940 to establish cultural ties and 
cooperation between the United States and Latin America.  The office was headed by Nelson A. 
Rockefeller and later renamed the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) 
in 1941.  Edward O. Guerrant, a political analyst who worked in the OCIAA, wrote that the 
efforts of the office fell into two general categories, “informational” and “specific cultural and 
educational projects,” what Joseph Nye would later refer to as strategic communication and 
cultural exchanges, respectively (Guerrant, 1950, p.121).  However, it should be noted that 
attempts to develop cultural ties in Latin America were actually initiated much earlier in FDR’s 
presidency and years before the creation of the OCIAA.   
For instance, at the 1936 Buenos Aires Conference U.S. delegates approved the motion to 
provide government assistance for a student-faculty exchange program and funding for an 
exchange of artistic exhibits and literary publications (Fejes, 1986, p.74).  Two years later, the 
State Department had established a Division of Cultural Relations, whose purpose was to 
promote educational exchanges with Latin America (Wood, 1961, p.305).  Sumner Welles also 
urged the nation’s colleges and universities to offer educational exchanges with Latin American 
universities as well as begin to incorporate courses on Latin American history and culture.  In 
fact, even the once prejudiced American textbooks began to change, dropping words like 
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“imperialism” to describe the new U.S. conduct and interest in the region (Black, 1988, p.61).  
Furthermore, many U.S. universities responded to Welles’s call by offering scholarships and 
fellowships to Latin American students for them to study in the United States (Fejes, 1986, p.73).  
However, cultural diplomacy went much farther during the Good Neighbor era than merely 
student exchanges, it included a wide array of strategic communication and cultural promotion.   
For example, a special Motion Picture Section of the OCIAA was established and 
directed by philanthropist and movie producer John Hay Whitney.  The motion picture division 
was created in part to build hemispheric solidarity to offset the dangerous rise of German 
propaganda aimed at dividing it.  Whitney noted it was his intent that: 
The menace of nazism and its allied doctrines, its techniques and tactics, must be 
understood from Hudson Bay to Punto Arenas.  Wherever the motion picture can do a 
basic job of spreading the gospel of the Americas’ common stake in the struggle, there 
that job must and shall be done (Black, 1988, p.69).   
Whitney and Rockefeller thought the problem with U.S. movies in Latin America at the time was 
that it was showing a negative image of the United States.  Therefore, it became their mission to 
“show the truth about the American way” through strategic communication (Fraser, 2005, p.75).  
This included a number of projects from newsreels, sports features, and musical programs, to 
educational films about everyday American life (Guerrant, 1950, p.123).  
Furthermore, Walt Disney, who was not a supporter of FDR, accepted a role in 
Roosevelt’s cinematic endeavor to change the minds of Latin Americans, becoming what one 
historian has called, “the first Hollywood producer of motion pictures specifically intended to 
carry a message of democracy and friendship below the Rio Grande” (Black, 1988, p.69).  
Disney had already produced propaganda films using his famous cartoon characters in such 
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shorts as Donald Gets Drafted and The New Spirit; for the projects introduced to Latin American 
audiences Disney created Saludos Amigos and The Three Caballeros (Fraser, 2005, p.74).  For 
inspiration he had taken several of his staff members to South America to help formulate ideas 
for the films.  The trip was later turned into a documentary and distributed by the OCIAA to 
display America’s friendliness with its southern neighbors.  Although Disney’s movies could be 
considered private initiatives since it was the Walt Disney Company that produced them, each 
project was under the auspices of the OCIAA and members of the Roosevelt foreign policy team 
(Guerrant, 1950, p.124).   
The OCIAA support for private projects whether it be the Disney films mentioned above 
or individually owned newspapers and magazines illustrate Roosevelt’s acceptance and 
awareness that the American message could be spread by both public and private means.  This 
included personal travel by Americans to Latin America, which was just now starting to increase 
after years of economic hardship in the United States.  One author has noted that as air travel 
became more available, “traveling south by the Pan-Am Clipper became one of the great 
adventures of the Age” (Black, 1988, p.65).  This of course was in harmony with Roosevelt’s 
broader aims to enhance cultural exchanges, which the OCIAA was willing to spend millions to 
achieve.  While the budget for the OCIAA’s first year of operation was only $3.5 million, by the 
end of World War II it had swelled to $45 million (Smith, 2000, p.81).  The purpose of cultural 
diplomacy was built on the notion that conflicts between the United States and Latin American 
states had been based on mutual misunderstandings of one another.  Therefore, through these 
various forms of cultural exchange people would become aware of and appreciate the 
“achievements and merits of each nation’s culture and society,” ultimately forming a bond of 
common values that would united the Western hemisphere (Fejes, 1986, p.75).   
 62
At the offset it can be argued the Good Neighbor policy was primarily negative in nature 
because it was pledging not to intervene and not to construct trade barriers.  Laurence Duggan, 
one of Roosevelt’s policymakers for Latin America referred to it as “clearing away deadwood” 
that was built up from previous administrations (Duggan, 1949, p.70).  However, at the same 
time FDR’s approach implemented assorted qualities of soft power, through positive political 
ideals, multilateralism, and through various forms of public diplomacy.  Therefore, the Good 
Neighbor policy’s ability to reflect the cornerstones of soft power outlined in the literature 
review and methodology chapters clearly indicates that the policy was a strong example of the 
soft power approach; thus the reason why it was selected to be included in this study.  In fact, 
even Joseph Nye himself the founder of the soft power concept has repeatedly labeled 
Roosevelt’s Latin American policy a soft power tactic (Nye, 2002, p.69; and 2004, p.9).    
 
The Effect on Influence 
The methodology for this thesis study is to measure the level of influence gained or lost by a 
particular power approach through the examination of the goals and objectives of the United 
States around the time that power method was implemented.  Although the U.S. government did 
not always specifically state or list its precise goals at the time of the Good Neighbor policy, its 
ambitions were clearly visible through speeches and recollections made by members of the 
Roosevelt Administration.  These goals can be categorized into two general groupings, short-
term and long-term.  The short-term aim of the FDR presidency in Latin America was to protect 
U.S. owned property.  The long-term objectives were to build hemispheric solidarity and 
establish more American style institutions in the region.   
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However, since this section pertains to influence the immediate reactions to the Good 
Neighbor policy must also be addressed.  It has already been stated that there was a great deal of 
fear and hostility toward the notion of intervention and U.S. economic and political domination 
in Latin America by the time of Roosevelt’s arrival.  As one friendly Uruguayan newspaper had 
reported, anti-American sentiment was so rampant that it would not be surprising to hear 
“Yankee imperialism blamed for the bad weather” (Wood, 1961, p.298-299).  Reactions to the 
new Good Neighbor policy were a shift away from this era of bad feelings, and it was Roosevelt 
that received all the acclaim.  Bolivian Ambassador to the United States Victor Andrade stated,  
Franklin Roosevelt deserves full credit for repudiating the ‘big stick’ policy formulated 
by his cousin Theodore.  In doing so he swept aside a century of fear and distrust which 
had divided Latin America and the United States (Andrade, 1976, p.54).   
Furthermore, at the opening ceremony of the 1936 Buenos Aires conference FDR’s twenty-five 
minute speech was interrupted fourteen times by standing ovations (Raymont, 2005, p.27).  The 
mood had clearly changed in favor of the United States, however that alone should not be 
equated to increased influence.  The following two sections analyze the effect of the Good 
Neighbor policy on specific policy objectives for which this study has deemed the most accurate 
measure and indicator of influence gained or lost in the region.   
Short-term Objectives 
The Roosevelt Administration used neighborliness as a tool to achieve U.S. interests; the intent 
was that through reciprocity where the United States behaved like a good neighbor Latin 
American states would respond in the same way, preferably by doing things that were in the 
interest of the United States.  One of these interests was the protection of American capital and 
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U.S. owned property in the region.  Numerous interventions had taken place during previous 
administrations in the name of protecting property owned by private U.S. citizens.  The new 
American strategy under the Good Neighbor policy was a rejection of that approach; however, as 
will be explained this new direction had no instant positive bearing on halting the seizure of 
property.  An examination of cases in Cuba, Bolivia, and Mexico reveals the failures of goodwill 
to achieve reciprocity in terms of protecting property and investment.   
At first the U.S. government attempted mediation in place of intervention to protect 
property abroad in addition to the various soft power methods noted in the previous sections of 
this chapter.  However, citizens and private companies of seized property wanted more forceful 
action from their government.  Furthermore, Latin American states often simply refused to 
arbitrate or would continue with the policy of appropriating property.  For example, in late 1933 
groups of Cuban citizens seized numerous American owned sugar mills on the island during the 
chaotic transition of General Fulgencio Batista coming into power.  Although U.S. warships 
were sent to Cuba, Cordell Hull was defiant that American troops would not be used.  Hull had 
even sent a telegram to Americans with capital invested on the island to inform them that the 
U.S. had “no intention of landing forces” (Wood, 1961, p.76).  Therefore, in a sense it became 
trouble-free for Cuban officials to destroy foreign owned buildings and machinery and confiscate 
the valuable sugar mills.  The fact that the United States removed the use of armed intervention 
from its foreign policy playbook allowed governments in the region to have less fear of 
retribution for their actions of confiscating U.S. owned property.   
In March of 1937, the government of Bolivia confiscated the oil properties of the 
Standard Oil Company.  Bolivian officials argued Standard Oil’s claim to the properties was 
fraudulent because they had avoided paying taxes.  Therefore, they could cancel the concession 
 65
that permitted Standard Oil to be there in the first place and take title of the property without any 
compensation (Wood, 1961, p.168).  Months of negotiations and talks dragged on eventually 
ending up in a bitter legal struggle in the Bolivian Supreme Court.  The matter was not 
completely settled until 1942 when Bolivia agreed to pay $1.5 million for the properties of 
Standard Oil, under the agreement the U.S. government would fund a $25 million economic 
development program (Green, 1971, p.49-50).    
In 1938, just one year after the confiscation of Standard Oil’s property in South America, 
American oil properties were expropriated by the Mexican government.  Mexican President 
Cárdenas and his administration took claim to the properties due to what they called a “labor 
dispute” over wages between oil executives and Mexican citizens who worked for the American 
owned corporations (Smith, 2000, p.76).  The oil company representatives believed that the 
Mexican government had long intended to take hold of the oil properties and the course of action 
taken by Cárdenas was a calculated move because he was fully aware of the U.S. pledge to 
nonintervention at Montevideo and Buenos Aires.  Since the property was “expropriated” and 
not “confiscated” the U.S. government believed the oil companies were at the very least entitled 
to receive prompt payment and just compensation for the property taken.  Mexico responded that 
the land and the resources of their nation were in the, “hands of the people who work it . . . [this] 
cannot be halted by the impossibility of paying immediately the value of the properties belonging 
to a small number of foreigners who seek only a lucrative end” (Guerrant, 1950, p.107).  The oil 
companies wanted a cash settlement of $260 million or the return of their property, the Cárdenas 
government was willing to do neither (Guerrant, 1950, p.108).   
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Using soft power and tactics that were designed to persuade were not bringing immediate 
results, consequently discontent and frustration was growing amongst members of the Roosevelt 
Administration.  Following the Mexican episode in 1938 Cordell Hull stated,  
The policy of this government during the last five years has been the policy of the Good 
Neighbor.  During these years the American Government has repeatedly evidenced its 
fulfillment of that pledge . . . The policy of equity and of reasonable and just treatment 
must have a reciprocal character (Wood, 1961, p.161). 
The actions in Cuba, Bolivia, and Mexico were not living up to the expectations set by the notion 
of reciprocity.  The aim to protect American investment and property abroad was not being 
achieved.   
The policy of nonintervention and extending cultural ties with Latin American states was 
supposed to prevent episodes like these from happening, not make objectives more difficult to 
accomplish.  The Cuban, Bolivian, and Mexican cases illustrate the fact this was true throughout 
the region whether it was the Caribbean, South America, or Central America.  Rather than 
waiting years for an agreement to be reached previous administrations that chose to employ 
armed intervention had little difficulty achieving their goals when they could overthrow the 
ruling government.  As Peter H. Smith described the pattern, “Military forces would arrive . . . 
depose rulers . . . install a hand-picked provisional government; supervise national elections; and 
then depart, mission accomplished” (Smith, 2000, p.51-52).  Therefore, in contrast it is logical to 
make the conclusion that the use of soft power had a negative impact on the objective of 
protecting U.S. owned property in Latin America, and thus brought a reduction in influence in 
the region.    
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Long-term Objectives 
As stated above the long-term objectives of the Good Neighbor policy were to build hemispheric 
solidarity and establish more American style institutions in the region.  In contrast to the 
administration’s short-term aims, these were goals the Good Neighbor policy was successful in 
achieving.  In fact, one historian has considered hemispheric solidarity to be the “crowning 
achievement” of the Good Neighbor policy (Smith, 2000, p.83).   
The intentions to secure ties in the Western hemisphere whether it was for military 
defense or other purposes was perhaps the chief objective and main interest in Latin America for 
the FDR Administration since the inter-American meetings held at Montevideo and Buenos 
Aires.  Roosevelt and his foreign policy team of Hull and Welles made it exceptionally clear that 
the efforts to reach out to Latin America through multilateralism and public diplomacy were to 
establish a sense of fraternity in the region.  In this regard the Good Neighbor policy was 
successful, whereas under previous foreign policies’ attempts to construct a coalition it was a 
much more difficult endeavor.   
The proverbial example is the difference in coalitions and opinions of Latin Americans 
during World War I and World War II.  During the First World War the number of nations that 
would support the Allied effort was half of what it would be during WWII; eight of which were 
U.S. protectorates at the time (Smith, 2000, p.84).  Furthermore, the only Latin American state to 
actually send troops to fight in the war to end all wars was Brazil (Skidmore, 1999, p.94).  More 
importantly, it should also be noted that during WWI Mexico was tempted by Germany to enter 
the conflict as a means to reacquire territory taken by the United States several decades before, 
which would have brought the war to U.S. soil (Schoultz, 1998, p.251).  Although some authors 
(Skidmore and Smith 2001) have made the argument that American influence might have been 
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on the rise during this time, it is quite clear the United States had difficulty achieving support for 
their side during the war and realizing other American objectives.   
In contrast, where the polices of his predecessors “did not win many friends,” Roosevelt 
began to be embraced by many Latin American leaders (Whitaker, 1954, p.134).  One of the 
clearest examples of this was with Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza García.  Once a friendly 
relationship had been established America’s influence with the Latin leader began to grow.  For 
instance, after Somoza and Roosevelt had met, Somoza replaced a composite picture of himself 
with Adolf Hitler in his office with four pictures of FDR; furthermore he renamed Managua’s 
main thoroughfare Avenida Roosevelt (Black, 1988, p.72).  However, lasting relationships did 
not only propel streets to be renamed in Roosevelt’s honor, it also had important positive effects 
on policy implications for the United States.   
After the attacks on Pearl Harbor Somoza proclaimed, “I consider every Nicaraguan 
aviator and soldier as a potential fighting man for the U.S.,” other Latin American leaders 
followed suit by declaring war on the Axis Powers (Black, 1988, p.75).  It is unlikely that before 
the Good Neighbor policy went into effect these same countries that had to previously and 
constantly worry about American intervention would now subdue their anger to defend this same 
country after it was just attacked.  By the end of 1941, nearly every American republic had 
“rallied around the U.S. in defense of hemispheric security” (Raymont, 2005, p.54).  Toward the 
end of the conflict nineteen Latin American countries either declared war on the Axis Powers or 
broke relations with those countries (Wood, 1961, p.324).   
Brazil offers a valuable example of this newfound support.  Although the country was 
rather supportive during World War I, the desire to participate on the side of the United States 
was at a new high.  For instance, Brazil permitted the use of its military bases and supplies in the 
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preparation of the North African invasion.  In fact, President Getúlio Vargas offered FDR the use 
of its coastal bases in 1937, long before the United States had even abandoned its isolationist 
stance (Skidmore, 1999, p.117-118).  Brazil also “insisted upon an active, on-the-ground combat 
role” in the war (MacLachlan, 2004, p.113).  Considering at the time the nation faced a possible 
attack from neighboring Argentina and had a total of only about 60,000 troops, their decision to 
volunteer 25,000 soldiers to the European campaign was a personal sacrifice.  To show their 
solidarity with American GIs Brazilian soldiers called themselves “Ze Cariocas” the name of a 
character that befriended Donald Duck in one of Walt Disney’s Latin American cartoons 
(MacLachlan, 2003, p.114).   
Roosevelt’s diplomatic efforts to befriend President Vargas and the bilateral trade talks 
with Brazil were also stimulants to this support.  Through bilateral negotiations the United States 
was able to secure exclusive contracts for Brazilian rubber; the same was done in Bolivia (Green, 
1971, p.104).  The much-desired resources of South America were heavily sought after by both 
the United States and the Axis Powers, but it was the United States that would benefit from 
Brazil’s participation.  
The ability of the United States to attract support in Latin America for hemispheric 
security and overall assistance for the Allied cause was further verified by Latin Americans in 
their response to disparaging remarks to Roosevelt’s soft power approach.  In 1943, Republican 
Senator Hugh A. Butler wrote an article for Readers Digest criticizing the Good Neighbor 
policy, complaining there was a great deal of wasted money being spent trying to buy support for 
the U.S. war effort.  Although at home the article had an insignificant impact on the 
implementation of the Good Neighbor policy (most politicians including Herbert Hoover 
supported it) it did strike a cord with the Latin American press, which angrily replied with 
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examples to disprove Butler’s claims.  One Costa Rican newspaper responded that any attempt 
by the United States to “buy friends” in Latin America would be indigently rejected by the proud 
citizens of Latin America (Wood, 1961, p.320).  In Guatemala, the newspaper El Imparcial 
noted, “The Latin Americans have made sacrifices affecting their welfare, their progress, their 
lives and lands, simply out of the need for solidarity action” (El Imparcial, 1943).  In Ecuador 
the press reminded Roosevelt’s critics that many privately owned yachts were refitted as naval 
vessels to assist the Allies.  However, an editorial in Venezuela’s La Esfera perhaps brought the 
strongest retort in how effective the Good Neighbor policy had become: 
Neither Butler nor the few who, chorusing him in nostalgia for the hard times of 
Coolidge’s imperialism, can change the Roosveltian line [which has brought] . . . a 
complete reversal in the sentiments of the Spanish American peoples who today look on 
the United States as a senior comrade, strong and just (La Esfera, 1943).    
Hull had also rejected Butler’s assertions, stating that Latin Americans had opened their 
harbors and ports to U.S. Naval ships, “welcomed and quartered our troops on their soil . . . [and] 
rounded up axis spies and saboteurs” (Wood, 1961, p.324).  In the case of Mexico, which two 
decades earlier was tempted to fight against the United States was now aiding the Allies by 
refusing to sell its oil to Japan (Wood, 1961, p.312).  “Mexico did not hesitate for a moment in 
helping protect the United States by preventing the Japanese, after their traitorous aggression, 
from making use of Mexican territory either for espionage or for belligerent actions” (La Prensa, 
1943).  Assessing the situation this was surely not the same Mexico that had received the 
Zimmerman Telegram. 
One may cite the case of Argentina and the country’s unwillingness to participate in the 
Allies’ war effort to claim that the soft power approach of the Good Neighbor policy was not as 
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effective as it is being claimed here.  However, it should be noted that from the start the level of 
pro-Nazi sentiment was much higher in Argentina than in other Latin American countries.  
Therefore, in order to bring the country into the Allied column it was certainly going to take 
more time; Argentina joined the Allies in March of 1945.  Furthermore, Argentina’s vigorous 
resistance to the attempts of the United States to transform the Pan-American association into a 
military alliance and the country’s overall state of neutrality might be due to the lack of U.S. soft 
power applied to the country not because of the application of it.  For instance, there was a great 
deal of difficulty in reaching bilateral trade agreements with Argentina in regards to the 
importation of beef because of domestic concerns in the United States.  Characteristic of 
Putnam’s two-level game theory (1988) Roosevelt was forced to politick domestically with 
Western state cattle ranchers and on the international stage with Argentine diplomats.  This lack 
of cooperation on economic matters that was found elsewhere in the region resulted in less 
trusting and lasting relationships.  Secondly, Edward O. Guerrant an official who worked in the 
OCIAA noted that Argentina was the one country that the United States refused to apply the 
“hands-off” policy of nonintervention because the administration did choose to implement what 
he called “mild economic sanctions” on the country (Guerrant, 1950, p.36).  Therefore, it is 
possible to claim that the Argentine case actually further supports the argument for soft power 
proponents who would like to see more hemispheric solidarity today.  
The second long-term objective of the United States and the Good Neighbor policy was 
to expand U.S.-style capitalism and democracy.  While in the short run the existence of 
dictatorships remained, towards the end of the Roosevelt Administration the cry for democracy 
was spreading in part by the example set by the United States.  In reference to the 1946 elections 
where Republicans took hold of the U.S. Congress, one Mexican newspaper reported it “was a 
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new proof of the effectiveness of democratic institutions” and that the U.S. incident would be a 
valuable lesson to those in Latin America that were “politically backward” and did not respect 
democracy (Wood, 1961, p.420).  To a certain extent, motivated by FDR’s January 1941 “Four 
Freedoms” speech tyranny was becoming less accepted, and a new climate of tolerance for 
pluralism was coming about.  For example, Nicaragua’s Somoza was feeling the heat from 
frequent protests about his unchecked power, and General Jorge Ubico of Guatemala was 
overthrown and replaced by the Abraham Lincoln admirer and New Deal proponent Juan José 
Arévalo (Black, 1988, p.80).  Furthermore, Brazil’s Getúlio Vargas who had postponed elections 
in 1938 and 1943 was now at the end of WWII under pressure from citizen disenchantment and a 
manifesto signed by some of the nation’s most prominent citizens calling for the restoration of a 
liberal constitutional government, compelling him to hold a popular election for the presidency 
(MacLachlan, 2003, p.115).  Therefore, while in the short run FDR was willing to make what 
journalist George Black had called a “Faustian bargain” with many of the dictators in Latin 
America by accepting their tyranny, it was the long-term objective of spreading democracy that 
was Roosevelt’s chief intent (Black, 1988, p.73).  As Roosevelt reportedly had said, Somoza 
might have been a son of a bitch, “but he’s our son of a bitch” (Black, 1988, p.71).   
In terms of influencing Latin American governments to adopt U.S. economic principles 
the domestic New Deal offered a persuasive example to follow.  President Plutarco Elías Calles 
of Mexico wrote in a letter to FDR: 
[your policy] coincides in general terms with the policy which we have sought to carry 
out in Mexico.  You may be sure that we particularly appreciate and admire the 
magnanimous work of your administration in favor of the unemployed, the workers, and 
the forgotten man in general (Wood, 1961, p.302).      
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Similar content was found in Central and South America.  A newspaper editorial in Uruguay 
noted the attractiveness of the New Deal because it opposed the “detestable oligarchy of the 
trusts and the bankers” (Uruguay, 1937).  For years Latin American governments were opposed 
to incorporating the American economic model because of what they had seen U.S. capitalists do 
in their own territory.  In addition, the photographs and news stories of the food lines and 
Hoovervilles of the Depression in the United States did little to attract Latin Americans to U.S. 
style capitalism, where the business of the country was business.  The New Deal offered a new 
approach.        
Latin American countries from all areas tried to emulate FDR’s economic example.  Julia 
Sweig commented that states in the region looked to Roosevelt’s model as a means for 
“modernizing their own backward, corrupt, unequal, and impoverished societies” (Sweig, 2006, 
p.6).  Furthermore, beginning in the 1940s the Caribbean Legion, a group of educated and 
idealistic men from the Caribbean and Central America fought for the development of 
democratic welfare states reflective of what was occurring in the United States.   
In sum, the long-term objectives of promoting capitalism, democracy, and hemispheric 
security were successful for advocates of the Good Neighbor approach.  On the other hand, the 
short-term goal of protecting the property and capital of Americans abroad was a 
disappointment.  The subsequent section presents the views of other scholars regarding the 
success and/or failure of the Good Neighbor policy.  The final section to chapter four will be a 
summation and conclusion of the policy and its effect on influence in the Latin American region.   
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Additional Scholarly Viewpoints 
Since this is a qualitative analysis and the potentiality for bias to occur is possible, it would be 
beneficial to include the thoughts of other scholars in addition to my own in regards to the 
impact the Good Neighbor policy had on U.S. influence in Latin America.  Overall, others have 
assessed Roosevelt’s soft power approach with high remarks.  “There can be none [sic] doubt 
about the influence and effect it had as a positive phenomenon on inter-American relations” 
(Raymont, 2005, p.60-61).  However, there are criticisms also worth mentioning, most of which 
point to early failures of the policy’s ability to bring about immediate results.  Nonetheless, most 
evaluations are affirmative.   
On the positive side of the spectrum there is an assortment of praises from both historians 
and political scientists.  Henry Raymont, a current history professor and prior long time 
journalist of U.S. Latin American relations noted that,  
In a scant twelve years, the Roosevelt administration developed a coherent, long-range 
hemispheric policy that effectively dispelled Latin American mistrust, won 
overwhelming congressional support, and substantially improved and consolidated the 
inter-American system.  The extent of the transformation brought about by Roosevelt’s 
New Deal and Good Neighbor policies was reflected in the drastically changed attitudes 
of the region’s liberal democratic movements previously opposed by Pan Americanism 
(Raymont, 2005, p.54).  
Raymont had also commented that the Roosevelt era was “unparalleled in taking hemispheric 
relations to the most constructive level in the twentieth century,” and that it “developed into a 
paradigm of harmony and cooperation against which all subsequent U.S. administrations were 
measured” (Raymont, 2005, p.xiv and p.33).  Edward O. Guerrant wrote that “the United States 
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has never had a foreign policy toward any area that was more successful than the Good neighbor 
policy was from 1933 to 1945” (Guerrant, 1950, p.212).  In regards to the Good Neighbor 
policy’s ability to achieve the objectives it set out to accomplish, the famed American historian 
Henry Steele Commager assessed FDR with much praise, “History may record that he did more 
to advance democracy than any president since Lincoln . . . and as much to strengthen capitalism 
as any statesmen since Hamilton” (Commager, 1950, p.354-355).  Others have labeled the 
Roosevelt era a “happy period” or “an expression of American idealism at its best” (Matthews, 
1963, p.133, and Humphreys, 1946, p.132).  Even the political scientist Peter H. Smith who 
tended to brand the entirety of U.S. relations with Latin America in his 2000 book as nothing 
more than the aims of a greedy and self-interested nation, refers to the Good Neighbor policy as 
a “golden era” (Smith, 2000, p.63).  He stated, “this new stance promoted goodwill and mutual 
respect,” and as a consequence it brought “nearly unanimous support for the U.S. throughout the 
Second World War” (Smith, 2000, p.63). 
However, Smith’s view of the Good Neighbor policy is somewhat ambivalent.  He may 
call it a golden era, but he also wrote that the policy “was not so much a departure from past 
practice as an adaptation and extension of it” (Smith, 2000, p.85).  He clarifies his argument in 
that,     
In the name of nonintervention, the Good Neighbor policy constituted yet another attempt 
to achieve, impose, and consolidate American supremacy . . . The United States was 
using new instruments in behalf of time-honored goals . . . Washington could [now] 
extract voluntary cooperation from Latin American governments (Smith, 2000, p.64).   
He refers to the United States as simply changing its techniques to acquire and expand its sphere 
of influence; it is proper for Smith to recognize the Good Neighbor policy as another approach 
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because soft power should be viewed as an alternative foreign policy tool, a form of benevolent 
Machiavellianism, one that works on persuasion in place of coercion.  As Fred Fejes wrote, 
“what was occurring was the abandonment of old, ineffective methods and techniques of control 
and the search for newer and more sophisticated ones” (Fejes, 1986, p.64).   
While Smith may not be critical of the Good Neighbor policy’s success as he is of its 
moral foundation, history professor David Green noted that “over the long run the Good 
Neighbor Policy was a failure” because of the rise of widespread revolutionary nationalism that 
took place in Latin America during Roosevelt’s tenure (Green, 1971, p.291).  This is true, but 
Green fails to comment on the efforts of Latin Americans to secure hemispheric ties, which was 
the goal of the Good Neighbor policy, not curtailing revolutions in the region, which he assumes.  
Furthermore, it was not the intent of FDR to bring rapid change to the political characteristics of 
Latin America.  As mentioned above, Roosevelt was willing to work with dictators and rising 
nationalism in the short run if it was able to assist in broader goals.  Political scientist Harold 
Molineu also criticizes the Good Neighbor policy’s ability to bring immediate results.  Molineu 
refers to the continued practice of confiscating U.S. owned property as evidence that the theory 
of reciprocity should have been rejected (Molineu, 1986, p.8).  
In total, the praise for the Good Neighbor policy’s ability to achieve objectives 
overshadows the comments of critics, however their criticisms are valid and do offer a more 
well-rounded assessment of soft power’s effect on U.S. influence in Latin America.     
Conclusion 
Through an examination of the events at the time, the Good Neighbor policy appears to have 
been able to attract a much friendlier Latin America, however that does not necessarily equate to 
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influence.  Through a split analysis of the short and long-term objectives of the Roosevelt 
Administration it becomes clear that the claims that the Good Neighbor policy was either a 
complete success or an utter failure is much too simplistic.  In the short-run the policy was 
unable to protect U.S. investment and property abroad, yet in the long run it did create the 
climate for hemispheric solidarity and American-like institutions.   
These outcomes reveal a great deal about the effect soft power has on influence.  It 
appears from the case study that soft power would be best understood as an investment to be 
reaped at a later date, rather than a tool used to bring swift results.  Aware of this admirer of the 
Good Neighbor policy Henry Raymont attempted to remind his readers that,  
The task confronting American democracy was not to lead a crusade against communism 
[or fascism].  The first duty was to create within the country, and later in the hemisphere 
as a whole, the conditions that would make communism [and fascism] impossible 
(Raymont, 2005, p.57).   
In the end, perhaps FDR’s vice president Henry Wallace said it best when he noted that the real 
benefits of the Good Neighbor policy were not to be achieved until well into the future; he stated, 
“We are children of the transition – we left Egypt but we have not yet arrived at the Promised 
Land” (Leuchtenburg, 1967, p.253).    
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONTRA WAR 
 
 
The second case study of this project deals with U.S. foreign policy towards Nicaragua during 
the Ronald Reagan Administration and the years that followed where his policies were 
continued.  In contrast to Franklin Roosevelt’s efforts to cooperate and build hemispheric 
solidarity, Reagan implemented a strategy of hard power tactics designed to achieve the 
administration’s goals, which for the most part centered on the notion of rolling back 
communism in Latin America.  Although the policy preferences of the president and the 
Congress often varied a great deal (see: Scott 1997), the focus of the case study here deals with 
the actions actually carried out, thus an emphasis on the administration’s foreign policy.  The 
Reagan Doctrine had called for providing assistance (including by military means if necessary) 
to anti-communist groups and friendly authoritarian leaders, who in return would ally themselves 
with the United States against the Soviet Union (LaRosa and Mora, 1999, p.10).  U.S. support for 
the counterrevolutionaries, better known as the Contras, in their war against the Marxist 
Sandinistas in Nicaragua became the “test case” of this doctrine (Roberts, 1990, p.67).  
Through an analysis of the specific U.S. implemented contra related polices and the 
success or failure of the U.S. objectives that such policies were aimed to accomplish, one can 
learn about the effect hard power has had on influence, which is the underlying goal of this thesis 
project.  This chapter is laid out in the same fashion as the chapter on the Good Neighbor policy.  
It begins with a short discussion on preceding American policies and influence, followed by an 
examination of the hard power tactics used by the Reagan Administration, and then finally 
concludes with an analysis on the change in influence.    
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The Beginnings of the FSLN and Preceding U.S. Policies 
Perhaps more than any other country in Latin America, Nicaragua has understood the phrase 
U.S. intervention.  Beginning with William Walker in the mid 1800s to the recent economic 
threats discussed by the current Bush Administration, the country has been forced to deal with 
the colossal neighbor to the north.  This was especially true in the opening decades of the 
twentieth century.  From disagreements over a possible canal route to Coolidge’s decision to 
send in troops to protect American owned property, the presence of the American government in 
Nicaragua was a constant irritation. 
In 1933, after the last U.S. marines were withdrawn from the country under the Good 
Neighbor policy, a power struggle occurred between the head of the U.S. trained National Guard 
Anastasio Somoza García and liberal activist Augusto César Sandino.  Somoza was able to trap 
the widely popular Sandino and have him assassinated in 1934, and subsequently install himself 
into the presidency on January 1, 1937.  Through the process of succession the Somoza family 
was able to maintain control of Nicaragua for a large portion of the twentieth century.   
Although varying in degree, by the 1970s corruption, ruthlessness, and human rights 
abuses became characteristics of the Somoza Debayle regime (It should be noted that over their 
forty two years of rule leaders of the Somoza Dynasty themselves also varied on the degree of 
abuse and corruption).  Moreover, some political scientists have gone as far to label the Somoza 
Debayle rule as “sultanic” (Paige, 1989, p.107; and Shugart, 1989, p.259).  Since there was an 
absence of representative institutions that would allow dissenting views to the Somoza power 
grip, armed resistance became the only available outlet for opposition.  Various guerilla 
movements sprouted in the 1960s eventually uniting into the Sandinista National Liberation 
Front (FSLN); the name “Sandinista” was used to pay homage to the Nicaraguan patriot Sandino 
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whose killing had instigated the Somoza Dynasty.  Some have hypothesized (Parsa 2000) that 
exclusive rule and extreme centralization of power can cause revolutions to materialize; the 
Nicaraguan case appears to support that statement.  Nevertheless, for the majority of their rule 
the Somozas were backed by the United States for their loyal support during the Cold War, 
however rising revelations of corruption and human rights abuses caused the United States to 
distance itself from the Nicaraguan government in the 1970s. 
The lack of strong U.S. support combined with growing domestic rejection of the 
regime’s brutal tactics triggered the Somoza regime to collapse at the hands of the FSLN in 
1979.  Once in power the Sandinistas announced that Nicaragua would no longer submit to the 
United States, and that the country would implement an “independent and nonaligned” foreign 
policy (Skidmore and Smith, 2001, p.336).  The Sandinistas also proclaimed they would take 
steps toward a mixed economy in order to improve the socioeconomic situation of its citizens.   
Although the Carter Administration had desperately searched for a third option between 
Somoza’s regime and the FSLN, after the revolution was deemed successful the president sought 
good relations with the Sandinistas (Raymont, 2005, p.226).  In contrast to Ronald Reagan who 
would recognize the FSLN as an immediate threat to U.S. national security, in the eyes of Jimmy 
Carter the Sandinista takeover represented a typical “Central American revolution” for which the 
United States should “try to help it and contain it simultaneously” (Pastor, 1999, p.246-247).  On 
July 24, 1979 the United States established diplomatic relations with the new government and 
began sending emergency food and medical aid to the war torn country; nearly one million 
Nicaraguans were in desperate need of food and another 250,000 had no shelter (Pastor, 2002, 
p.160).  It was also the intent of the administration to handle the situation multilaterally, by 
working “with friendly democratic governments in the area and Europe to encourage them to be 
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helpful as well” (Pastor, 2002, p.160).  According to Carter the purpose of aiding the junta was 
to prevent it from “turning to Cuba and the Soviet Union” for help (Raymont, 2005, p.226).  As a 
result the policy was successful in achieving that objective.  For one it did prevent Nicaragua 
from falling into the position Cuba had found itself in when it became trapped and dependent on 
one ideological bloc.  In fact, a majority of the financial help coming into Nicaragua during this 
time was not from the Soviet Union, but from Western Europe and the United States exhibiting 
the possibility for expanding Western influence (Skidmore and Smith, 2001, p.336).     
However, in 1980 the U.S. approach towards Nicaragua began to change.  For instance, 
the Republican Party platform of that year “deplored” the Marxist Sandinista takeover of 
Nicaragua, and with the arrival of the Cold Warrior Ronald Reagan to the White House a 
dramatic shift in polices was put on the agenda (Skidmore and Smith, 2001, p.336).  This shift 
was in part prompted over anger in the conservative ranks that felt America’s prestige had been 
weakened by a Democratic administration that had not only lost a valuable ally in Nicaragua, but 
also caused national embarrassment during the Iran Hostage Crisis by not reacting more 
forcefully.  Therefore, a more hard-line stance in U.S. foreign policy, especially to what was 
perceived as a Soviet threat, was to be adopted by the new president.  Professor Ivan Molloy 
stated that this included “military force to crush ‘communism’ in Nicaragua and a strengthened 
blockade of Cuba,” which he notes was considered “the major supplier of arms to Marxist forces 
in Central America” (Molloy, 2001, p.88).  The change in tactics represented a clear contrast in 
the U.S. power approach.  The following section is a description of how Ronald Reagan’s contra 
war policies against the Sandinistas is a reflection of the hard power qualities outlined in the 
literature review and methodology chapters.  The final section is an analysis on how that 
approach effected U.S. influence in Latin America. 
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The Contra War Policy as Hard Power  
To counter the Marxist Sandinistas the Reagan Administration initiated a number of polices 
which up until this point in the paper have been simply labeled under the umbrella term “contra 
war.”  However, the hard power approach to Nicaragua involved coercive diplomacy, economic 
sanctions, as well as military support for counterrevolutionary forces.  These policies are 
described in detail below.   
Unilateralism and Coercive Diplomacy  
It was noted in the methodology chapter that one of the advantages of utilizing the contra war 
case in this study is its ability to counter the qualities of soft power as well as reflect those of 
hard power.  The unilateral approach carried out under Ronald Reagan resonates this notion.  In 
order to support anti-communist groups and leaders in Latin America (a crucial component of the 
Reagan Doctrine) the administration contended it was forced to “free itself from restraints of the 
multilateralism” mandated under the treaties of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
(Raymont, 2005, p.236).  The Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams declared that,  
We can’t abdicate our responsibility to protect our interests to a committee of Latin 
American countries . . . The notion that if we have interests at stake we should ask Latin 
Americans what to do about it is wrong (Pastor, 2001, p.80). 
The justification for a more unilateral approach was claimed to be in the name of national 
security (Smith, 2000, p.185), similar to the arguments made by the current Bush Administration 
in the lead up to the war with Iraq.   
A noteworthy example of this unilateralism is the Reagan Administration’s rejection and 
obstruction of the Contadora initiative and subsequent peace plans.  In 1982 leaders from 
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Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama formed the Contadora Group in an effort to seek 
regional mediation of the conflict between the Sandinistas and the contra rebels, as well as the 
fighting occurring elsewhere in Central America (Roberts, 1990, p.82).  The Reagan 
Administration resisted the efforts of the Contadora Group and appointed their own commission; 
predictably the commission concluded that “the United States cannot use the Contadora process 
as a substitute for its own polices” (Smith, 2000, p.214).  Meanwhile the OAS, the European 
community, as well as several Latin American countries including the Nicaraguan government 
supported the proposals offered by the Contadora Group.  In an effort to hinder this process the 
United States pressured Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras not to sign the final draft, 
ultimately killing the proposed treaty (Smith, 1987, p.98).  After the unsuccessful attempt by the 
Contadora nations, newly elected Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sánchez introduced a plan 
to Central American leaders that called for them to negotiate the peace in Central America 
themselves without outside interference.  Although Arias himself disliked the Sandinistas and 
offered a plan that would bring democracy to Nicaragua, his efforts were also blocked by the 
Reagan Administration (Pastor, 2002, p.209).      
As a result of ignoring the multilateral forum of the OAS and hindering the peace plan 
presented by the Contadora Group and President Arias, hemispheric relations began to 
deteriorate at the disgust of not only regional leaders but also the world community.  As Bruce 
W. Jentleson commented, “In Nicaragua, the Reagan policy never could credibly claim any 
significant international legitimacy;” and that the Reagan Administration’s unilateral behavior in 
the country was “rejected by the western allies, by the countries in the region, and by the United 
Nations” (Jentleson, 1991, p.82).  
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The use of unilateralism and coercive diplomacy, or “verbal assault” as it was once 
labeled by James S. Scott (1997), sprouted out of the perceived urgency the region played in the 
administration’s eyes; Central America was America’s “backyard” and any Soviet presence 
would be deemed too close for comfort and intolerable for national security (LeoGrande, 1998, 
p.10).  For example, Reagan’s UN ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick claimed in 1981 that Central 
America was the “most important place” in the world for the United States in their fight against 
communism (Smith, 2000, p.182).  In 1983, Reagan singled out Nicaragua; “The government of 
Nicaragua has treated us as an enemy . . . The national security of all the Americas is at stake” 
(Smith, 2000, p.185).  Also that year the president publicly stated that the majority of the 
Congress and the country was not prepared “to stand by passively” while the Sandinistas fell into 
the communist bloc (Scott, 1997, p.246).  In a 1985 press conference Ronald Reagan was even 
brash enough to say that he wanted the Sandinistas to “cry uncle” (Department of the State 
Bulletin, April 1985, p.11).  Gradually, as former U.S. ambassador Viron P. Vaky claimed, 
diplomatic options were either “foreclosed or discarded” and tough talk ruled the day (Vaky, 
1987, p.42).  
One reason why Reagan refused to negotiate a peace process, even when other nations in 
the region were working relentlessly to offer one, was the belief that a Marxist regime was 
simply not trustworthy (see: Elliot Abrams, press conference, 8/17/1985).  Using the threat of 
U.S. invasion members of the Department of Defense wanted the FSLN to know that “Nicaragua 
could not be trusted to observe a treaty and that the United States would have little choice but to 
intervene militarily if a peace agreement was signed and then broken” (Roberts, 1990, p.86).  
Although the United States would ultimately rely on guerilla fighters and not American marines 
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to carry out their objective, the intimidation of force was a believable threat given the history of 
U.S. intervention in the region and the recent invasion into Grenada in 1983.      
Economic Sanctions 
In regards to economic hard power the United States was willing to use coercion and action as a 
means to make governing more difficult for the Sandinistas.  One of the first tactics utilized by 
the Reagan Administration was the dangling of aid in front of the Nicaraguan government, which 
had been cut off right before President Carter left office, if the Sandinistas agreed to stop 
supporting the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) fighters in El Salvador.  U.S. 
Diplomat Wayne S. Smith discussed the scenario as if it were a game for members of the Reagan 
Administration who had no real intentions of ever reinstating the aid.  He wrote, “if Managua 
acceded to U.S. demands, Washington would consider resuming aid; if not, the United States 
would announce its definite termination” (Smith, 1987, p.91).  However, when some evidence 
arose that pointed to the Sandinistas complying with U.S. demands, Smith comments that the 
administration accused the Nicaraguan government of bad faith anyway and cut off all remaining 
aid.     
A more complicated use of economic leverage involved the blocking of loans, 
commercial credit, and international assistance.  Not long after coming into office the Reagan 
Administration began lobbying against new loans the Nicaraguan government was attempting to 
acquire from both multilateral lending agencies and private banks.  It was added to what one 
Treasury Department official called the “hit list” of countries the United States was going to 
deny loans and assistance (Morrell, 1985, p.1-7).  In fact, there was one incident in 1982 where 
the U.S. government threatened the Bank of America from making a $30 million loan to 
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Nicaragua for the purposes of allowing the country to make a scheduled debt service payment 
(LeoGrande, 1996, p.332).  
However, most of the time the United States flexed its economic muscle within 
international lending agencies where it used its economic clout to apply leverage to the 
Sandinistan government’s domestic projects.  For example, in most cases voting stock within 
multilateral banks is based on each country’s financial contribution, and like William LeoGrande 
noted, “as the largest contributor to all the banks, Washington naturally wielded considerable 
influence” (LeoGrande, 1996, p.333).  The United States was able to use this influence in 1983 
when it vetoed a $2.2 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) aimed at 
finishing a rural road project in Nicaragua.  The approval of the loan required a two-thirds 
majority, but with the United States controlling thirty-five percent of the voting stock the loan 
never had a chance of being approved (LeoGrande, 1996, p.333).  (See also: Naylor and Blum 
2001, for a deeper analysis of U.S. foreign economics as a means to pressure foreign 
governments).       
A more controversial U.S. move occurred in 1984 when the Nicaraguan government 
requested $58 million from the IDB to aid small private farmers.  At first the loan seemed likely 
to be approved, for all preliminary committees had endorsed the advance and the United States 
was unable to veto it by itself, but at the final IDB board meeting U.S. Director Jose Manuel 
Casanova threatened to walk out if the Nicaraguan loan was brought up for a vote.  Casanova’s 
walkout was a serious threat because without the required attendance of directors needed to have 
a quorum, the United States would be paralyzing all IDB operations (Morrell, 1985, p.1-7).   
In general, American participation within the network of international lending agencies 
was necessary for their success.  Therefore, when Secretary of State George Shultz warned IDB 
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President Ortíz Mena that if loans to Nicaragua were to be approved U.S. Congressional support 
for the international financial institution would deteriorate and contributions would decrease, 
foreign officials felt the pressure (Kornbluh, 1987, p.112).  This pressure was highly effective in 
stripping Nicaragua of aid; in the two years prior to the Reagan Administration’s strong-arm 
tactics the country received $193 million from the IDB and $91 million from the World Bank, 
whereas in the first two years of applying economic leverage those numbers decreased to $34 
million and $16 million, respectively (LeoGrande, 1996, p.337).          
The most notable example of U.S. economic hard power directed at Nicaragua was the 
U.S. led embargo.  Although the embargo did not officially begin until the spring of 1985, 
LeoGrande notes that the beginning of trade obstacles were initiated in 1981 when the United 
States denied Nicaragua’s credit through the U.S. Import-Export Bank, which would have made 
short-term loans to the Sandinistas in order to aid them in their efforts to trade; without such 
loans the Sandinistas would be forced to use hard currency for anything that was imported from 
the United States (LeoGrande, 1996, p.337).  In 1984 Reagan took a closer step to implementing 
an embargo when he signed National Security Decision Directive 124 (NSDD 124), calling for 
U.S. officials to “review and recommend economic sanctions against Nicaragua” that were likely 
to “build pressure on the Sandinistas” (Kornbluh, 1987, p.93).      
On May 1, 1985, President Reagan used his executive authority by declaring a national 
emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose an 
embargo on Nicaragua without congressional approval (Department of State Bulletin, July 1985, 
p.74).  Although by this time Nicaragua’s trade with the United States was less than fifteen 
percent of its total trade, the embargo was still significant (LeoGrande, 1996, p.339).  The 
embargo prohibited: 
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All imports into the United States of goods and services of Nicaraguan origin; all exports 
from the United States of goods to or destined for Nicaragua . . . Nicaraguan air carriers 
from engaging in air transportation to or from points in the United States; and vessels of 
Nicaraguan registry from entering into United States ports (Department of State Bulletin, 
July 1985, p.74).   
This became troublesome for many of Nicaragua’s workers who would do without spare parts 
for any of the U.S. manufactured goods and equipment they owned.  In contrast, Nicaraguan 
products exported to the United States such as bananas and sugar could easily be replaced from 
other markets.  
In total, the Reagan Administration gradually implemented piecemeal economic 
constraints on the Nicaraguan government.  First by cutting off aid, then by pressuring 
international lending agencies from granting loans, to ultimately installing an embargo aimed at 
crippling the Sandinistas.  Along with coercive diplomacy (i.e. using economic and military 
threats to establish pressure) these actions are forgotten and less discussed than the more 
publicized contra war, nevertheless these policies are significant components of Ronald Reagan’s 
hard power activities in Nicaragua.       
Military Support to the Contras  
The military support and aid given to counterrevolutionary forces in Nicaragua was the 
centerpiece of Reagan’s hard power approach to what has been referred to here as the contra war 
policies.  After the debacle in Vietnam, hostile public opinion and a resurgent Congress restricted 
the American president’s ability to wage war.  Considering these limited options the Reagan 
Administration was forced to adapt its preference to what was possible; from this the strategy of 
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low intensity conflict (LIC) was born.  According to Molloy low intensity conflict allows U.S. 
intervention in a foreign conflict to appear local and domestic with “only peripheral American 
involvement” (Molloy, 2001, p.2).  Therefore, the decision to support the contras in Nicaragua 
became the hardest power approach available for an administration under constraints from public 
opinion and checks and balances.  As Viron Vaky called it, the “in-between response” (Vaky, 
1987, p.42).  
The contras were founded in 1981 under the sponsorship of the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency.  American officials were able to organize the remaining heart of Somoza’s National 
Guard and combine it with a number of Miami-based backers and Miskito Indians to create the 
insurgent force that was to carry out the fight U.S. soldiers did not have license to do.  Not until 
March of 1982 when the first military actions were underway by the contras did reports begin to 
surface about the Reagan Administration’s efforts to support them (Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
1987, p.A-2).  As a result the adverse Congress passed the first Boland Amendment baring the 
CIA and the Department of Defense from spending funds toward overthrowing the Sandinista 
regime in Nicaragua (Pastor, 2001, p.72).  Nevertheless, President Reagan continued his public 
verbal support for the contras referring to them as “freedom fighters” while chastising 
Democratic leaders who wanted to cut off their aid (Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1987, p.A-2).      
However, the contras were not the only arm of military force the Reagan Administration 
chose to utilize.  In 1983, Dewey Clarridge, the CIA’s chief of operations for Latin America 
suggested the creation of a special commando force composed of CIA contract agents known as 
“unilaterally controlled Latino assets” or UCLAs (LeoGrande, 1996, p.340).  Years later one of 
the UCLAs explained that their mission was “to sabotage ports, refineries, boats and bridges, and 
try to make it look like the contras had done it” (Kornbluh, 1987, p.47).  William M. LeoGrande 
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claimed at times U.S. Navy SEALs were also involved and that between the fall of 1983 and 
April of the next year UCLAs and American Special Forces had conducted nineteen attacks, 
most of which were on Nicaragua’s oil storage facilities causing millions of gallons of gasoline 
to be lost (LeoGrande, 1996, p.340-341).  The success of these operations led to more elaborate 
plans including Clarridge’s suggestion to mine Nicaraguan harbors.  The mining began in 
January of 1984, and although the incidents had been public knowledge since then, it was not 
until April 6 that The Wall Street Journal revealed that the CIA had provided “logistics and 
supervision” for the mining of Nicaraguan harbors (Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1987, p.A-3). 
This revelation had a striking impact on President Reagan’s ability to support the contras’ 
war effort, for at the time Congress was debating on allowing additional aid to the contras.  In 
December of 1983, Congress under the second Boland Amendment had set a $24 million cap on 
military funds, and therefore Reagan’s request for an additional $21 million in January was now 
being criticized and opposed by both Republicans and Democrats.  Congressional leaders were 
outraged over the fact that they were not consulted on the U.S. government’s foreign policy.  In 
the aftermath of the Vietnam War and Watergate, Congress had taken steps to restore its “advice 
and consent role” including passing laws that demanded they have a “greater role in the policy-
making process” (Rosati, 1999, p.332; and Rosati and Twing, 1998, p.39).  These alterations 
were sidestepped by the administration.  Furthermore, Congress was also distressed about a 1983 
Associated Press report that claimed the CIA had approved a manual advocating the 
assassination of Nicaraguan government officials (LeoGrande, 1998, p.363).  The full extent of 
the illegal actions undertaken by members of Reagan’s staff would not be uncovered until the 
Iran-Contra Hearings in 1987. 
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However, after a short period of forbidding further support, it seemed Congress was 
willing to forgive these known mishaps and grant more aid.  In 1985 the Reagan Administration 
was successful in acquiring $14 million for the contras albeit with several stipulations on how 
the money could be spent, and in 1986 a total of $100 million in aid was approved 
(Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1987, p.21).  As a result of the reinstating of aid, “thousands of 
contras re-infiltrated” Nicaragua with a second wind to fight the Sandinistas (Roberts, 1990, 
p.93).         
The financial support of the United States was crucial for the contras to be successful, as 
their principal military commander Enrique Bermúdez had admitted, “we live or die on whether 
the [U.S.] Congress decides to aid us again” (Vaky, 1987, p.45).  During the two year absence of 
funding Ronald Reagan instructed his National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane to “assure 
the contras of continuing administration support [and] – to help them hold body and soul 
together – until the time when Congress would again agree to support them” (Pastor, 2001, p.72).  
It was during this time period that NSC staff member Oliver North would undertake the 
clandestine responsibility of finding alternative forms of financing for the contra fighters in 
Nicaragua.       
These actions demonstrate the dramatic extent members of the administration and his 
staff were willing to go to support the contra fight without public knowledge and Congressional 
approval.  Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh note that,  
to win the war at home, the White House created a sophisticated apparatus that mixed 
propaganda and intimidation, consciously misleading the American people and at times 
trampling on their right to dissent (Parry and Kornbluh, 1988, p.3). 
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Despite these efforts the administration still had difficulty obtaining domestic support.  A 1986 
New York Times / CBS News poll reported that the American public was against aiding the 
contras by a two to one margin; in fact polls never reached fifty percent in favor of aiding the 
contras (Pastor, 1987, p.260; and Vaky, 1987, p.46).  As a result of the administration’s illegal 
activities and unpopular moves, their actions went against what can be considered the appeal of 
American ideals.  By skirting the U.S. Constitution the Reagan team was undermining U.S. soft 
power giving further evidence that the president’s contra war policies are firmly and 
categorically synonymous with the elements of hard power.       
Conclusion 
Although Reagan’s successor ultimately would be held in higher esteem for his pragmatism and 
multilateral efforts, according to Kenneth Roberts, at first when George H.W. Bush came into 
power he “refused to relinquish the lever of military coercion” and “insisted that the contra army 
be left intact” (Roberts, 1990, p.95).  Furthermore, the embargo was left in place until 1990, 
exhibiting the continuation of the hard-line approach beyond Reagan’s time in office.  The contra 
war policies are a well-rounded example of hard power because they involved unilateralism, 
coercive diplomacy, economic sanctions, and military force.  However, in many respects the 
polices could have been harder, if sanctions had not been implemented in a gradual process, if 
the United States had chosen to put U.S. marines in Managua, and if the Reagan Administration 
had not been limited to its options after the Iran-Contra Scandal the case would reveal an even 
stronger example of hard power.  However, the ability of the case to exhibit all of the qualities of 
hard power makes it superior to those that may only reflect one element at a greater extent.  The 
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subsequent section analyzes the hard-line tactics of the contra war policy in terms of its effect on 
influence.    
 
The Effect on Influence 
In order to determine what effect the contra war policies had on U.S. influence in Latin America 
the same method used for the Good Neighbor policy of analyzing specific objectives and 
outcomes will be implemented here.  Unfortunately, the goals of the contra war policies are not 
as obvious as one may predict.  For example, the short-term objective of removing the 
Sandinistas from power is too simplistic of a statement; although the overall aim of the Reagan 
Administration was arguably regime change, the goal of halting FSLN support to FMLN rebels 
in El Salvador and crippling the Sandinistan government apparatus from being able to operate 
were more specific aims.  Therefore a combination of these goals has been considered here as the 
short-term objectives of the contra war policies, and thus that is what will be analyzed below.   
The long-term objective of the contra war policies was to keep in place a pro-American 
anti-leftist region.  In other words to maintain a Latin America compliant or at least friendly to 
American interests, and to accept a kind of “older brother” relationship with the United States 
where they would play the part of the obedient little brother (Raymont, 2005, p.237).  It is faulty 
to assume the long-term goal of these policies was to win the larger ideological Cold War; there 
are too many other variables and additional fronts in that conflict against the Soviets to insist that 
this was the long-term aim of the contra war policies.   To account for those variables, the 
objectives in the Latin America region, predominately with Nicaragua is what is being examined 
here.  Therefore, it should be understood that the long-term objective of the contra war policies 
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was not to destroy the Soviet Union, but to ensure a submissive and pro-American region and 
Nicaragua. 
Short-term Objectives 
As noted above the short-term aims of the Reagan Administration and the respected contra war 
policies involved various specific goals that revolved around the notion of regime change, but 
regime change itself was not the complete short-term goal.  This confusion can be better 
understood with what Vaky has called the “maximum” and “minimum” goals of Reagan’s 
intentions (Vaky, 1987, p.50).  The maximum goal was to overthrow the Sandinistas, and at 
minimum the objective was to contain the regime from assisting other leftist groups and to let it 
self-destruct through attrition.  As Bruce Jentleson wrote, “the original rationale for supporting 
the contras was to impose foreign policy restraint on the Sandinistas in the interest of regional 
security” (Jentleson, 1991, p.66).  Therefore, it should be understood that the immediate 
overthrow of the Nicaraguan government might have been desirable, but it was not the complete 
short-term objective.  This has been argued and supported by several scholars (Hufbauer and 
Schott 1985, Vaky 1987, Jentleson 1991, Wiarda 1992).        
Considering these objectives as the short-term aims of the contra war policies, evidence 
shows that Reagan’s hard power approach was successful in gaining influence.  From early on 
economic leverage appeared to be effective in stopping the FSLN from supporting leftist rebels 
in El Salvador.  In 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig offered the renewal of economic aid 
that had been cut off during the Carter Administration to the Sandinistas if they obeyed U.S. 
demands to halt their support for the FMLN guerillas in El Salvador.  The economic threat 
worked, the Sandinistas pledged to stop their arms flow to the rebels and they shut down a 
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“clandestine” radio station broadcasting messages to the FMLN (Roberts, 1990, p.77).  A month 
later, the State Department confirmed the actions reporting that they had “no hard evidence of 
arms trafficking within the last few weeks, and propaganda and other support activities [had] 
been curtailed” (Smith, 1987, p.91).  Even the CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman had 
acknowledged that the Sandinistas were “cutting back” their arms supplies to the FMLN 
(Jentleson, 1991, p.68).  However, regardless of these concessions, Washington still refused to 
reinstate aid packages to the country, perhaps because this was around the same time the Reagan 
Administration started authorizing covert operations against the Nicaraguan government.      
As support for the contras got underway the Sandinistas found themselves facing further 
economic challenges.  For example, after the first attacks by contra forces the FSLN was forced 
to declare a state of emergency and mobilize their armed forces (Scott, 1997, p.243).  As a result 
many of the socialist programs that the Sandinistas had initiated just a few years before now had 
to be canceled or condensed because of the need to extend military spending.  These were the 
first of a series of blows the Nicaraguan government was forced to deal with. 
Further compromises were made on the part of the Sandinistas after the 1983 U.S. 
invasion of the Caribbean island nation of Grenada.  Fearing the Reagan Administration would 
choose to put marines in Managua next, the FSLN took steps to appease the United States.  For 
example, the Nicaraguan government declared “partial amnesty” for contra rebels, “relaxed” 
censorship on the press, and even announced possible plans for an election in November of 1984 
(Roberts, 1990, p.78).  It was clear from early on that U.S. policy was having an impact on the 
FSLN’s policies and ability to maintain popular support.    
The contra war along with economic sanctions employed by the United States also had a 
toll on the Nicaraguan economy.  Although many of the socialist programs had been canceled by 
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the mid 1980s, the drastic increase in military spending to fend off the contras went from ten 
percent of the national budget in 1983 to forty percent in 1987, causing welfare initiatives 
unlikely to ever be reinstated (Roberts, 1990, p.92).  For instance, the Sandinistas were forced to 
claim nearly $1.15 billion in “war-induced damages” to the nation’s infrastructure and 
production (Roberts, 1990, p.92).  After the start of the embargo in 1985 the economy fell into a 
crisis.  In 1987 inflation topped 1,300 percent, and by 1988 hyper-inflation of 33,000 percent had 
set in, not to mention that over twenty-five percent of the country was unemployed (Roberts, 
1990, p.92).  Daily life in Nicaragua was becoming extremely difficult, and as a result it affected 
the Sandinistas ability to stay in power.      
By the end of the decade the FSLN was forced to negotiate with the contras and hold an 
election in 1990, which ultimately brought their demise.  Since many of the popular social 
programs that gave them backing in the beginning had to be dropped in order to fight the contras, 
support for the Sandinistas had evaporated.  As one scholar wrote, “the vote in the 1990 election 
was anti-Sandinista” (Jentleson, 1991, p.67).  Even Carter’s National Security Advisor for Latin 
America, Robert A. Pastor had noted it was Reagan’s hard power tactics that had “squeezed” 
moderates to the right after being squeezed to the left during the revolution (Pastor, 2002, p.248).  
And with the arrival of a new government, the Reagan Administration had accomplished their 
objective.     
The desired goal of overthrowing the Sandinistas was a lofty ambition.  Furthermore, as 
Bruce Jentleson wrote, “In Nicaragua, the uncle-saying objective to which the Reagan 
Administration aspired was quite disproportionate to the limited military means at its disposal” 
(Jentleson, 1991, p.70).   Twenty years earlier Alexander George had stated, “demanding a great 
deal of an opponent  . . . makes the task of coercing him all the more difficult” (George, 1971, 
 97
p.225).  Therefore the ability to bring regime change and replace the Sandinistas with a coalition 
government composed of “Washington’s closest allies” was a notable feat for an administration 
that was unable to use American forces (Roberts, 1990, p.102).     
In conclusion, the hard power policies implemented under Ronald Reagan were 
successful in achieving the various short-term objectives; however the ten years it took for the 
FSLN to be removed from power does question hard power’s effectiveness for more challenging 
short-term aims.  Nevertheless, the evidence appears to show that the hard power policies of the 
contra war did have a positive impact on influence.   
Long-term Objectives 
The long-term objective of the Reagan Administration’s policies in Nicaragua was to secure the 
position of American hegemony in the Latin American region and to ensure that countries in the 
area would be obedient to U.S. policy preferences, specifically Nicaragua.  According to William 
Robinson and Kent Norsworthy, “the [1979] Sandinista victory shattered U.S. pretensions to 
regional supremacy, and, in the eyes of some, signified the beginning of the end of U.S. 
domination in the region” (Robinson and Norsworthy, 1987, p.25-26).  Therefore, while halting 
the Sandinista’s military support to the FMLN in El Salvador was one of a few immediate aims, 
the creation of a compliant Latin America was the administration’s more long-term objective, 
and thus Nicaragua would be the central battleground to reestablish this supremacy.   
As a whole, many members of the administration viewed Latin American countries 
condescendingly.  For instance, Jeane Kirkpatrick believed that “violence or the threat of 
violence is an integral part of these political systems” and that “coups, demonstrations, political 
strikes, plots, and counterplots are, in fact, the norm” (Schoultz, 1998, p.378).  This sentiment 
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temporarily carried over into the Bush Administration where the new U.S. president publicly 
called the Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega a “little man” (Schoultz, 1998, p.xi).  Therefore, with 
the perception of superiority and that Latin America was their own backyard, the Reagan team 
felt they should be able to dictate the behavior of those countries (hence why he was reluctant to 
work multilaterally); for that reason establishing a type of paternal relationship has been 
considered the long-term goal.   
However, that would not necessarily be how things turned out.  While Reagan’s hard-line 
tactics were eventually able to topple the Nicaraguan government, many leftist politicians were 
elected into power and managed to control some of the nation’s key institutions (Skidmore and 
Smith, 2001, p.338).  Furthermore, even those that were elected from the right did not guarantee 
that the United States would have all of its demands met.  The same could be said about the rest 
of Central America.  As Robert Pastor noted, the United States was unable to “convince Latin 
America or impose its vision on the region” (Pastor, 2001, p.77).  Historian Alan McPherson 
said Reagan’s war policies “aroused the indignation of much of Latin America,” and like many 
other Latin Americans, Mexican writer Carlos Fuentes promised to “oppose its [the U.S.’s] 
arrogant and violent policies in Latin America” (McPherson, 2006, p.99).     
In fact, to limit its dependency on the United States, the new Nicaraguan government 
sought relations and aid from other foreign sources including countries in Asia and Europe 
(Aviel, 2003, p.53).  For example, to the displeasure of the United States, Nicaraguan President 
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro visited Taiwan in early 1992 where she signed a series of 
cooperative agreements and received limited military aid (Aviel, 2003, p.53).  In Europe, 
Nicaragua was able to secure financial aid from Germany, Spain, as well as from Scandinavian 
countries including aid to professionalize its police and intelligence services.   
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Even more so Nicaragua was able to solidify ties with its Latin American counterparts.  
In the post contra war years Nicaragua began to increasingly work cooperatively with its 
neighbors to improve its economic situation as well as strengthen overall regional collaboration.  
This collaboration along with increasing good relations with foreign states around the globe gave 
the United States less influence in controlling Nicaragua’s actions.  A more independent Latin 
America and defiant Nicaragua attempting to rise from the ashes of the 1980s made it more 
difficult for the United States to achieve objectives regardless if they were still considerably 
weak and the United States was the world’s sole superpower.  As Howard Wiarda noted, “the 
United States has not been much more successful in controlling its clients than the Soviets have 
theirs” and that it was no longer “the case of the colossus of the north . . . keeping Latin America 
in chains” (Wiarda, 1992, p.126, p.106).  
Nicaragua and its regional counterparts also often stood on the opposite side of the 
United States in terms of international issues.  Although Nicaragua was one of many Latin 
American countries to support the UN Security Council resolutions against Iraq in the early 
nineties, the nation remained devoted to the Non-Aligned Movement.  This was in stark contrast 
to their behavior during the Good Neighbor era when the government was obliged to go along 
with the U.S. point of view.  Furthermore, Nicaragua’s 1993 votes in the United Nations only 
coincided with those of the United States thirty-five percent of the time; and for the Latin 
America and Caribbean region at large only two member states voted more identical with the 
United States than against (Aviel, 2003, p.56; U.S. Department of State, 1995). Not until a few 
more years into the Clinton Administration when U.S. foreign policy in Latin America differed 
greatly to that of Reagan’s did Nicaragua’s votes in the United Nations begin to coincide with 
U.S. votes at roughly fifty percent (U.S. Department of State, 1995).  This alone is evidence that 
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the United States under the contra war policies did not make Nicaragua their Central American 
pawn.  Even in 1992, Wiarda wrote that Congress was starting to see Latin America “as a black 
hole into which it pours billions of dollars and gets nothing in return” (Wiarda, 1992, p.80). 
On the other hand, one may wish to contend that the sweep of democracies occurring in 
Latin America during the eighties (Brazil, Grenada, Uruguay, and Guatemala to name a few) 
should be credited to some of Ronald Reagan’s policies, and that this growing number of 
democracies equates to a more pro-American region.  While regional democracy was and still is 
in America’s interest it did not necessarily guarantee that American objectives would be met.  
For example, foreign ministers from four newly created democratic governments joined the 
original Contadora Group that obstructed Reagan in his attempts to wage war against the 
Sandinistas.  Furthermore, while there may be little dispute in academic circles that Reagan’s 
intervention in Grenada did replace a Marxist regime with a democratic one, other new 
democracies failed to credit Reagan.  For example, Robert Pastor wrote that, “most of the newly 
elected presidents in South America risked his displeasure by acknowledging the contribution of 
his predecessor” instead of him for their new status (Pastor, 2001, p.79).             
During the early nineties, Nicaragua along with much of Latin America was far from 
compliant with U.S. desires, the region either looked elsewhere or to countries within its own 
region for guidance, not to the paternal order of the United States.  Not long after removing the 
Sandinistas from power, the FSLN began to slowly rebuild its support and in 2006 Daniel 
Ortega, one of the leaders of the 1979 revolution was elected president providing final evidence 
that the American long-term objective had not been met.  Michael Shifter, vice president for 
policy at the Inter-American Dialogue noted that, “we got rid of the Sandinistas and said 
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everything else would take care of itself . . . his victory [Ortega] is a reminder of the price the 
U.S. so often pays for prematurely declaring its missions accomplished” (Padgett, 2006, p.51).   
Additional Scholarly Viewpoints 
The scholarly evaluation of the Reagan Administration is rather mixed, but slanted more towards 
the negative.  While few distinguish between the success and failure of the contra war policies’ 
ability to achieve short-term versus long-term objectives, the remarks of historians, political 
scientists, as well as practitioners do offer a broader assessment of the policies at large.      
One difficulty of examining the remarks of individuals on a rather contemporary political 
event particularly with those that were involved in the matter is that bias occurs.  As Robert 
Pastor stated, there is a “stake in defending that policy” (Pastor, 2002, xiv).  Ironically, Pastor 
himself is an example of this scenario.  He has written that the U.S. government “did not succeed 
in dislodging the Sandinistas” while the Carter Center, with which he was affiliated, was able to 
help navigate a democratic transition (Pastor, 2002, xiv).  This to some extent is true, but only 
after the use of hard power crippled the FSLN into making political concessions.  The same 
problem occurs with comments made by Reagan’s UN ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick.  In a 
March 1990 column written for the Washington Post titled, “Nicaragua: The Credit” Kirkpatrick 
praised Ronald Reagan for being “steadfast” in his effort to support democracy in Central 
America, however at the same time the article overlooked Reagan’s support for friendly 
authoritarian leaders (Kirkpatrick 1990).  The comments from Pastor and Kirkpatrick are not 
only affected by personal bias but also simplify exceptionally complicated events.  As Kenneth 
Roberts wrote, “events in Nicaragua are [were] considerably more complex than these [type of] 
interpretations would suggest” (Roberts, 1990, p.68).   
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However, an examination of the remarks made by scholars who did not have a direct 
personal interest in its outcome also reveals varied assessments.  Historian Fredrick B. Pike 
noted that, “Beginning in 1979, Nicaragua’s Marxist Sandinistas managed for over ten years to 
stare down the United States in its efforts to oust them” (Pike, 1992, p.338).  His argument 
centers on the notion that the hard power method utilized by Reagan should not be categorized as 
a success because the Sandinistas were able to fend off the United States for over a decade.  
Journalist George Black is also critical commenting that,       
The United States’s inability to work its will on one of its puniest neighbors, Nicaragua . . 
. when the great universal ideals of freedom and democracy were said to have been at 
stake, led to a devastating loss of the superpower’s most precious asset – its credibility 
(Black, 1988, p.xiii).     
In contrast, Bruce Jentleson (1991) and Kenneth Roberts (1990), although reluctant to give the 
hard power approach too much credit, did recognize its strengthens for achieving partial success 
in accomplishing U.S. goals.  For instance, Professor Jentleson wrote that “the military presence 
from the contras was a factor in the Sandinistas’ acquiescence to an election,” and Roberts 
commented in 1990 that “Nicaraguan policies have clearly been shaped by U.S. pressure” and 
that, “indeed, economic coercion played an important role in the U.S. strategy to promote 
attrition in Nicaragua that would wear down and weaken the Sandinista government” (Jentleson, 
1991, p.67, and Roberts, 1990, p.97, p.92).  Howard Wiarda concurred noting “there can be no 
doubt that without the U.S. pressure there would have been no elections in Nicaragua” (Wiarda, 
1992, p.185).  Nevertheless, all three fail to see the end of the Sandinista regime as a direct 
response to only U.S. hard power.  For example, Roberts credits the change in government to the 
“complex interrelationship between coercion, regional intermediation, and multilateral 
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negotiations,” thus a combination of soft and hard power, what Joseph Nye has called “smart 
power” (Roberts, 1990, p.101; Nye, 2004, p.32).  
However, there are also those who sing praise to the contra war policies’ hard power 
ability to affect U.S. influence in a positive way.  William M. LeoGrande gives credit to the use 
of economic hard power for destabilizing the government and causing it to collapse.  He notes 
that the contra war helped magnify the effectiveness of the economic embargo in destroying the 
nation’s economy, which evaporated the base of popular support the Sandinistas had.  As he 
states, “the sanctions did alter the domestic balance of Nicaragua political forces sufficiently to 
drive the Sandinistas out of power” (LeoGrande, 1996, p.344).    
In 1985 Hufbauer and Schott gave similar accolades to the president by crediting 
Reagan’s economic hard power tactic for the progress made at that time against the Nicaraguan 
government. They noted that although economic sanctions had not been “calamitous” to the 
Sandinista regime they were “costly,” and if the economic leverage had been applied more 
decisively and not in a piecemeal fashion as it had been the Reagan team might have achieved 
their objectives by the time of their article’s publication (Hufbauer and Schott, 1985, p.732).   
The Hufbauer and Schott argument brings up an interesting point.  Criticism that Ronald 
Reagan’s hard power policy did not bring the immediate overthrow of the FSLN is not that hard 
power does not work, but that the contra war policies could have been much harder.  As 
Hufbauer and Schott state, “Nicaragua is a case where a bolder use of economic weapons might 
have worked” (Hufbauer and Schott, 1985, p.733).  As time would show they did work.        
In the end most evaluations of Reagan’s handling of the affair are negative.  However, it 
must also be said that most of these criticisms fail to connect the hard power tactics with the 
administration’s different objectives in Nicaragua.  For example, George Black is critical of the 
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president because the events in Nicaragua damaged the “credibility” of the United States.  That 
may be true, but his criticism has more to do with the type of tactics implemented by the 
administration and less to do on whether or not such policies were ultimately successful.  
Fredrick B. Pike’s conclusion also misreads U.S. goals because he focuses his criticism on the 
Sandinistas’ ability to stay in power against American opposition for ten years, but what Pike 
does not say is how the United States was able to halt the FSLN support to FMLN guerillas and 
chip away at the Sandinistas’ governing capability, ultimately causing their fall from power.  
These were minimum short-term goals of the administration; the overthrow of the FSLN in the 
country was surely a desired outcome, but it was not the complete short-term objective.  As even 
the Carter Administration member Viron Vaky reminded in 1987, 
The principal arguments have been that a longer war of attrition will so weaken the 
regime, provoke such a radical hardening of repression, and win sufficient support from 
Nicaragua’s discontented population that sooner or later the regime will be overthrown 
by popular revolt, self-destruct (Vaky, 1987, p.45).   
After a review of the assessments made by various scholars it calls into question my previous 
verdict that hard power may not be as effective for more challenging short-term aims.  What 
appears to be a more accurate evaluation is that the shortcoming of not bringing swifter regime 
change is not due to hard power, but due to not enough of it.  However, in regards to my 
evaluation of the Reagan Administration’s ability to accomplish their long-term aims there is 
wide scholarly support to my conclusion that that was an objective where the president’s hard 
power policies did not work.     
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Conclusion 
The assessment of the hard power tactic, exemplified here as Ronald Reagan’s contra war efforts 
should not be equated to an evaluation of his presidency or of his role in the events against 
Nicaragua.  While some have labeled his eight years as a “committed Presidency” run by a 
“detached President,” and others have remembered him as “sharp, informed . . . and on top of the 
issues,” these assessments are not valid for what is being investigated here (Rockman, 1988, p.8; 
and Wiarda, 1992, p.7).  The analysis of the hard power methods employed by his 
administration, which were carried out with or without his full knowledge, have been the sole 
subject of this investigation on how such methods affect influence.  In conclusion hard power 
tactics were effective in acquiring the short-term aims of halting the Sandinista support to FMLN 
guerillas in El Salvador and crippling the FSLN’s governing capability, and would have been 
even more effective in terms of regime change if the policy was harder.  However, in terms of 
long-term objectives the hard-line methods sprouted resentment, ultimately making it more 
difficult for the United States to accomplish future goals.  By no means did the fall of the FSLN 
usher in a compliant Nicaragua.       
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
 
I began this study with the notion that an analysis of a soft power case and a hard power case 
would reveal which strategy has a more positive effect on American influence in Latin America.  
The results that were produced do not garner such a conclusion possible.  In brief, what appears 
to be closer to the truth is that both power methods, exhibited by the Good Neighbor policy and 
contra war examples, have had both positive and negative effects for U.S. influence in the 
region.  
The methodology implemented in this study examined specific short-term and long-term 
objectives of the Good Neighbor and contra war policies.  By doing so it created criteria to 
evaluate the successes and failures of the soft and hard power approaches and the respective 
foreign policies of both Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan.  In contrast, many historical 
assessments of presidential administrations’ accomplishments in Latin America have been based 
on personal experience or less calculable qualitative factors (Raymont 2005, Pastor 2001, Wiarda 
1992).  Therefore, the results and subsequent inferences presented here in the concluding chapter 
should merit a more valuable product for foreign policymakers and the political science 
discipline at large.              
 
General Deductions 
In Joseph Nye’s 2004 seminal book Soft Power he stated that a combination of both soft and 
hard power, what he refers to as “smart power,” is best for constructing a successful U.S. foreign 
policy (Nye, 2004, p.32).  The results of this study support Nye’s notion that both soft and hard 
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power matter in terms of acquiring influence, but they also question his assumption that the two 
power approaches must be complementary in action to be successful.  In both cases utilized for 
this study, each was polarized towards one power approach, and yet both were successful in 
achieving stated goals albeit one in the short-term and the other in the long-term.  While 
certainly a more exhaustive examination of additional historical case studies would be necessary 
to have more confidence in such a claim, the results of this thesis also indicate that hard power is 
more appropriate for immediate short-term objectives and soft power is better suited for long-
term goals, regardless if the other power approach is present.   
In the case of the Good Neighbor policy soft power was ineffective in halting Latin 
American governments from confiscating U.S. owned properties.  When the threat of force and 
intervention was taken off the table the nations of Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba had little to deter 
them from continuing their practice of seizing property.  However, in regards to the long-term 
aim of the Roosevelt Administration to construct hemispheric solidarity the investment of soft 
power was successful.  The clearest example of this success is the comparison of the feeble 
hemispheric alliance in World War I to that of World War II where nearly every Latin American 
government came to the aid of the United States.  The establishment of friendly ties to America’s 
neighbors to the south created a bedrock of support for America’s goals that would exist 
throughout the remainder of Roosevelt’s time in office. 
In contrast, the hard power contra war case exhibits the inverse effect on influence.  In 
the short-term the use of economic sanctions and military might was successful in halting FSLN 
support to guerillas in El Salvador and was also relatively effective in undermining the 
Sandinista regime.  However, in terms of building a compliant client state of the United States, 
the hard power approach did not cause Nicaragua to fall under the thumb of the United States.  
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The long-term objective of using force to erect a pro-American region simply did not occur; the 
divergence of opinion on international matters at the UN and the collaboration of Latin American 
states to work against the will of the United States is evidence of that failure.       
Therefore, these two cases reveal that each power approach can bring about an increase 
in influence as well as a reduction, thus showing the value of each at different times and for 
different goals.  It is important to maintain international capital created by soft power to 
withdraw from in the future when needed, as it is to have the muscle to deliver a powerful punch 
when immediate harm confronts the nation and its pressing goals.  The results from this study 
not only question Nye’s assumption that soft power and hard must be complementary in order to 
be successful, but that each power approach might be more effective in a respected time frame.   
 
Short-term and Long-term Implications 
This thesis study supports Nye’s argument for soft and hard power to be implemented by U.S. 
policymakers because it reveals that both can have positive effects for American influence.  
However, by extending Nye’s notions to a new level, the results from this study offer an 
additional contribution to the discussion on power within the political science discipline because 
it unveils the possibility that each approach might be best suited for different goals over a 
specific period of time. 
Hard Power 
As described briefly above and in more in-depth in chapter five, a hard power approach was 
effective in achieving the Reagan Administration’s short-term aims.  This is because hard power 
via military might is possible of delivering harmful impacts immediately to a foreign foe’s 
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national security.  Likewise economic sanctions, although taking more time than bombs and 
bullets to take effect, can trigger economic ramifications in a short period of time.  This was 
evident in the contra war case when the Sandinistas began to curtail their support to the FMLN 
guerillas in El Salvador in order to receive aid packages from the United States (Roberts, 1990, 
p.77).   
Through this example and others described in the study, hard power is capable of 
producing influence in the short-term because it affects another state’s behavior also in the short-
term.  States must instantaneously react to armed invasion and economic leverage, deciding 
either to comply with the aggressor’s demands or resist them.  When the decision is made to 
obey the aggressive state using hard power it plainly exhibits the power approach’s effectiveness.  
However, if the target state elects to fight off the aggressor it then becomes a match between the 
two over who has the most hard power.  This perceived outcome has caused realists (Waltz 
1979) to claim that rational states will seek additional hard power and other realists 
(Mearsheimer 2001) to advocate an increase in U.S. military spending.  This perception of 
international relations can be supported with an abundance of historical Latin American cases 
where the state with more muscle has been able to defeat the lesser state and thus maintain or 
acquire more influence (i.e. Falklands War, Mexican American War).  Furthermore, incidents 
with non-state actors, including those unable to use military force, such as those in the economic 
realm where large corporations can employ economic hard power leverage against smaller 
retailers in order to drive them out of business displays hard power’s effectiveness to bring 
results in the short-term. 
However, as the cases of this study reveal, hard power is not as effective in the long-term.  
The goal to create a compliant Nicaragua or an entire region ready to assist the needs and wants 
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of the United States did not occur because that is an objective that stretches over a great deal of 
time.  Hard power as explained above triggers an immediate behavioral reaction; it does not 
instigate a long-term change in behavior, only a swift temporary one.  For example, World War I 
may have halted Germany’s aggression in the interim, but it did not permanently stop the country 
from conquest; in fact the Allied Powers chose to adopt a different tactic towards the German 
people in 1945 because the severe post-war demands after the First World War did not prevent 
Germany from waging war again.  Therefore, in order to change the behavior of a state or non-
state actor for the long haul it suggests a different approach be utilized.   
Soft Power  
In contrast to hard power, soft power does not cause a target state to immediately respond to the 
state or actor employing it.  For this reason soft power could be considered ineffective for short-
term objectives.  This was evident in the Good Neighbor policy’s attempt to bring about the end 
of U.S. property being confiscated by Latin American governments abroad.  The influx of 
multilateral cooperation, cultural exchanges, and other acts of public diplomacy did not trigger 
the Mexican, Bolivian, or Cuban governments to instantly react to Roosevelt’s approach with 
acts of cooperation.  Rather in the short-term the absence of American military reprisal allowed 
these foreign governments to continue seizing property, exhibiting America’s inability to achieve 
its stated goals, which was the measure of influence for this thesis.           
However, in the long run the Good Neighbor policy was successful in changing the 
attitudes of Latin American governments, therefore aiding the United States for its long-term 
goal of hemispheric solidarity.  It is perhaps more beneficial to view soft power as an investment 
towards long-term influence rather than a technique that provides a quick advantage as hard 
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power can.  Since soft power persuades other actors to want what one wants rather than coerces 
them (Nye 2004), it requires more than a mere sudden change in the opinion of a target state; in 
order to genuinely alter the behavior and desires of another actor it takes more time.  This was 
exhibited in the two case studies where the soft approach of the Good Neighbor policy had over 
time secured friendly ties with Latin America and the hard power strategy of the Reagan 
Administration was fruitless in its endeavors to construct a compliant region to U.S. demands.  
Therefore, soft power does not change opinions for the short-term, but rather remolds them for 
future use by the actor employing soft power.           
The short-term objectives of Ronald Reagan and Franklin Roosevelt were both items that 
demanded a swift favorable reaction towards American policy.  Reagan implemented a technique 
that delivered a swift response, while Roosevelt employed a strategy that that did little to rapidly 
extend American influence.  Conversely, these tactics had the opposite effect in terms of 
achieving the long-term goals of each administration.  Therefore, the two case studies presented 
here in the study offer the possibility that both hard and soft power have different short-term and 
long-term implications.       
Politicians and Theorists  
Although the use of hard and soft power examined in this project were carried out under 
Republican and Democratic administrations, respectively, it should not lead one to conclude that 
within the use of different power approaches there is a partisan parallel.  Lyndon Johnson’s 
escalation of the war in Vietnam and Richard Nixon’s diplomatic approach to open up dialogue 
with the Chinese are examples of how that notion can be misleading.   
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An examination of international relations theorists can be more productive in terms of 
understanding short-term and long-term implications of the different power approaches.  The 
divergence of thought on the concept of power between realists and liberals was expounded in 
the chapter two literature review; in that section it was revealed that there was a tendency for 
realists to argue in favor of hard power and liberals to emphasize the importance of soft power 
(see also: Cooper 2004).  These theoretical power type preferences can be better understood 
when one examines the realist and liberal perspectives of international relations.   
The realist interpretation of an evil versus good world where predators are out to attack 
the United States requires one to respond quickly to such confrontations (Brown, 2001, p.31-33).  
Whether it is those that favor a troop buildup against a rising China (Brzezinksi and 
Mearsheimer 2005), or those that believe torture can keep Americans safe from relentless 
terrorists (Krauthammer 2006), realists often perceive America’s goals in the short-term.  For 
that reason, it is plausible to suggest realists favor hard power because of its ability to change 
behavior in the short run.      
In contrast, liberals have a more optimistic view of the world (Brown, 2001, p.22-23).  
They believe through the spread of free markets and democracy wars and attacks against the 
United States can be prevented.  Woodrow Wilson’s liberal internationalist position for 
democratic peace is not only an example of this optimism, but also of the long-term perspective 
for which liberals often view their policies.  For instance, Wilson’s theory of expanding 
democracy was not an attempt to bring swift change to American influence, but rather to create a 
climate that makes it more possible for the United States to acquire and maintain influence.  In 
addition, liberals that argue that the unipolar moment will not last and therefore the United States 
needs to collaborate with other world powers (Kegley and Raymond 1994) are thinking from a 
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long-term point of view.  For that reason of thinking ahead, liberals may be stressing the 
importance of soft power.     
Neither realists nor liberals are wrong to assume their power approach preferences are 
capable of achieving their time-sensitive goals; the two case studies involved in this study 
support those claims.  However, there is a fallacy in stating that both power methods must be 
implemented and “combined” together in order to improve a state’s level of influence; this is 
what Joseph Nye has claimed with his notion of smart power (Nye, 2004, p.32).   In 2005 Nye 
stated, “In American foreign policy, it’s not that you can rely on one or the other alone” (Pathak, 
2005, p.9).  On the contrary, it is possible to have cases exclusive to one power approach that 
positively affect American influence; the soft power Good Neighbor policy’s ability to do so in 
the long run and the hard power contra war policy’s ability to bring influence in the short run is 
evidence of this.  Therefore, there is an argument for the exclusive utilization of soft or hard 
power, consequently causing a problem of validity for Nye’s smart power concept.   
 
Drawbacks to Nye’s Smart Power 
The Good Neighbor policy and the contra war policies do not reflect Nye’s notion of smart 
power because each foreign policy approach was exclusive to a single form of power.  According 
to Nye, these cases should have failed to bring influence to the United States in Latin America, 
however as reiterated throughout the paper each case was able to achieve goals of both the 
Roosevelt and Reagan Administrations.  These cases reject Nye’s claims that soft power and 
hard should be complementary to be effective (Nye, 2004, p.32).          
 114
Therefore, is it necessary for foreign policymakers to follow Nye’s prescription to 
combine both power tactics for today’s problems?  In other words, how will soft power defeat Al 
Qaeda terrorists that are currently planning attacks against the United States?  The results from 
this study suggest hard power alone is capable of achieving this short-term goal.  At the same 
time, soft power through cultural exchanges and the general attraction of American style 
democracy and free markets could persuade Middle Eastern governments to extend ties to the 
United States without being coerced to do so, allowing for the increase of long-term U.S. 
influence in terms of favorable oil prices and regional authority.  In regards to Latin America, is 
soft power alone not also capable of doing the same thing in Cuba as far as persuading the Cuban 
people to adopt policies that would be more beneficial for the United States in the long run?       
In sum, this study argues that it is possible to rely on a single power approach to achieve 
influence.  This rebuffs Nye’s assertions that soft power and hard power must be combined in 
order to be most effective.  As described above, a single power approach is capable of 
accomplishing an actor’s goal.  However, in the grand scheme of foreign policy the 
implementation of both hard and soft power tactics is best to acquire and maintain influence.  
Therefore, as the results of this thesis make known, smart power may not be a necessity for 
individual policy responses to foreign policy problems, but rather more suitable as a theoretical 
foundation for an overall foreign policy doctrine.         
 
Conclusion 
Although the findings of this study do indicate the possibility that hard and soft power are 
perhaps best suited for different time-sensitive goals and each can have a positive effect on 
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influence without the other power approach being present, it does not deem smart power to be 
irrelevant.  The current war in Iraq is an example where the persistent use of an effective mix of 
both hard and soft power could have produced more favorable results than the existing outcomes.  
For instance, the use of U.S. military hard power was successful in overthrowing Saddam 
Hussein from power, but could have been even more successful if time had been spent before 
hand building a genuine multilateral coalition (Matthews, 2003, p.51).  Likewise, in the long run 
hard power is needed to protect Iraq’s people and infrastructure from insurgents, as is the soft 
power of attracting Iraqi citizens to the notion of liberal democracy.       
However, at the same time there are foreign policy examples of a persistent combined use 
of both hard and soft strategies that have failed to produce America’s goals.  For example, 
although originally initiated by Colombian President Andrés Pastrana as a means to end the drug 
trade in his own country through outside investment, Plan Colombia has become a significant 
centerpiece of U.S. policymakers’ war on drugs (Crandall 2002).  Hard power tactics such as the 
use of American military personnel to hunt down and kill drug cartel leaders combined with the 
soft power traits of bilateral collaboration and humanitarian aid have done little to nothing to 
remove illicit drugs from American neighborhoods (Isacson, 2005, p.44-45; it is also possible 
that the wrong soft and hard power tactics have been used).  Therefore, after comparing the Iraqi 
and Colombian cases one is left with an ambiguous assessment on whether or not smart power 
can work. 
Furthermore, there are times when using a power approach can hurt U.S. influence, not in 
its inability to achieve a goal, but to make situations even worse.  For example, German political 
scientist Josef Joffe has written rather extensively on American soft power and its often adverse 
effects in Europe, where an influx of U.S. culture has occasionally led to government retort and 
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legal action (Joffe, 2005, p.16; see also: Johansson 2004).  Therefore, rather than persuading 
other actors to American preferences soft power can also detract them further away from 
America’s goals.  Hard power can do the same.  The implementation of the economic embargo 
towards Cuba during the 1960s was aimed at punishing Fidel Castro for his socialist policies, but 
rather than recanting Castro immediately turned to the larger socialist ideological block of the 
U.S.S.R. for assistance, consequently decreasing American influence within the context of the 
Cold War (Raymont, 2005, p.226).  Therefore, the use and results of power can be complicated.   
To confuse things even more, multilateralism and unilateralism are not perfectly 
correlated with soft and hard power.  The Good Neighbor policy was a unilateral soft power 
approach that used multilateralism, whereas the first Gulf War was a multilateral effort to use 
hard power.  Furthermore, although I claim the Good Neighbor and contra war policies were 
exclusive power cases, soft power and hard power are not always that disconnected to one 
another.  In other words the application of power is perhaps not as black and white as these two 
cases suggest, and that not all foreign policy approaches fit nicely into these categories of soft 
and hard power (i.e. Clinton’s Kosovo campaign).  As stated by defense experts Kurt Campbell 
and Michael O’Hanlon (2006), employing hard power usually requires “elements of soft power 
in the mix;” and as British General Charles Guthrie noted (2006), a soft power case often 
“needs” hard power in order to back up its mission or purpose.   In sum, the concept of power 
can be beyond perplexing.     
In regards to this thesis’s original intent to discover which power method produces more 
influence in Latin America, one is left with more complexity than a simple answer.  Is hard 
power better suited for short-term goals than soft power?  Is soft power the superior strategy to 
achieve long-term goals?  There are clearly ambiguities in what scholars have assumed about 
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power.  More research in the history of U.S. Latin American relations, as well as with other 
regions, states, and non-state actors is necessary to better understand the use of power.  If 
political scientists and policymakers wish to be able to construct more effective foreign policies 
that will achieve greater American influence, they must first better comprehend the effects of 
various power approaches.  This thesis is a contribution towards that goal.  
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